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This paper extends the standard principal-agent model to allow for agents having
reference-dependent preferences according to K˝ oszegi and Rabin (2006, forthcom-
ing). With agents being loss averse in this sense, implementation problems arise
which are not an issue in the standard model. Strategic ignorance of information
by the principal, turning a blind eye on bad performance in particular, allows to
overcome these problems and may even reduce implementation costs. Finally, these
ﬁndings are shown to be robust with respect to various assumptions.
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1 Introduction
“I found that if you have a goal that you might not reach it. But if you don’t have one then you
are never disappointed. And I gotta tell you it feels phenomenal.”
- Vince Vaughn (Dodgeball)
Though a hilarious funny movie otherwise, there certainly is a grain of truth in that almost
philosophical quote from the motion picture ‘Dodgeball’. People suﬀer from disappointment
when they fail to reach goals that they wanted to achieve and, moreover, people may prefer not
to try at all in order to avoid that disappointment. One formal way to capture this phenomenon
is loss aversion: when an outcome falls short compared to some reference point, people incur a
loss. But then, if the prospect of not obtaining a desired reward may discourage an individual
from trying to reap that reward, one question is immediately at hand: Why do so many incentive
schemes put forth in the literature propose to reward an agent for good performance which is
more likely - but not certain - to be observed the higher the agent’s eﬀort. The idea that
rewarding good performance may backﬁre in this sense is also in contrast to the intuition of
K˝ oszegi and Rabin (2006) who introduce a model of reference-dependent preferences in which the
reference point is determined by rational expectations: In the conclusion they argue that if agents
are loss averse and expectations are the driving force in the determination of the reference point,
then“in principal-agent models, performance-contingent pay may not only directly motivate the
∗In preparing this paper we have greatly beneﬁted from comments made by J¨ org Budde, Paul Heidhues
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agent to work harder in pursuit of higher income, but also indirectly motivate [him] by changing
[his] expected income and eﬀort.” The question that we try to answer in this paper therefore is
who is right, Hollywood-based philosophy or economic intuition? And the answer we ﬁnd is the
favorite answer of many economists: It depends.
We analyze a simple principal-agent model with moral hazard where the agent has reference-
dependent preferences. The moral hazard aspect is fairly standard: With the eﬀort chosen by
the agent not being observable, in order to provide incentives the principal has to make use of
a veriﬁable binary measure of performance. While the principal is assumed to be risk-neutral,
the agent’s preferences are reference-dependent in the sense of K˝ oszegi and Rabin (2006). This
implies that the agent is risk averse in the sense that he always would reject a fair gamble. In
particular this means that the agent’s overall utility is composed of standard intrinsic utility1
and gain-loss utility. The reference point compared to which gains and losses are evaluated is
determined by the agent’s rational expectations about outcomes, which we assume to be formed
at the moment where the agent chooses his action. This assumption makes choice-acclimating
personal equilibrium (CPE), as introduced by K˝ oszegi and Rabin (forthcoming), the appropriate
equilibrium concept. We show that if the agent is suﬃciently loss averse and if the performance
measure is - in an intuitive sense, which is to be made precise - suﬃciently informative,t h e n
it is not possible to motivate the agent to exert any eﬀort at all, no matter how strong the
incentives provided by the principal. This is in stark contrast to the standard case without
loss aversion, where any eﬀort level can be implemented as long as incentives are suﬃciently
high-powered. These implementation problems, however, can be remedied if the principal can
commit herself to turning a blind eye from time to time, that is, by stochastically ignoring the low
realization of the performance measure. Besides alleviating implementation problems, turning a
blind eye may also lower the cost of implementing a certain action. These ﬁndings are at odds
with several seminal contributions in the ﬁelds of information economics and incentive design:
First, strategic ignorance of information obviously contradicts the Informativeness Principle by
Holmstr¨ om (1979). Secondly, we ﬁnd that the suﬃciency part of Blackwell’s celebrated theorem
does not hold in our model when the agent is loss-averse in the above sense. Moreover, with
bad performance being ignored as a result of agents’ loss aversion, which in some sense can be
interpreted as a compression of performance ratings, our analysis also suggests an alternative
explanation for a well documented ﬁnding in the personnel literature which has become known
as leniency bias. We show that the identiﬁed implementation problems persist and still can be
resolved by turning a blind eye when several simplifying assumptions of the basic model are
relaxed. Last, we consider a situation where the agent forms his expectations before choosing
his action. As discussed in detail in K˝ oszegi and Rabin (forthcoming), this change in timing
makes preferred personal equilibrium (PPE) the appropriate equilibrium concept. We show that
our ﬁndings remain valid also under this alternative equilibrium concept.
There is a small but steadily growing literature that analyzes the implications of loss aversion
on incentive design. With reference-dependent preferences being at the heart of loss aversion
on the one hand, but with no unifying approach provided how to determine a decision maker’s
reference point on the other hand, it is little surprising that all contributions diﬀer in this par-
ticular aspect. Dittmann et al. (2007) ﬁnd that a loss-aversion model dominates an equivalent
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risk-aversion model in explaining observed CEO compensation contracts if the reference income
is assumed to be exogenously given by the previous year’s ﬁxed wage. Iantchev (2005) considers
a market environment with multiple principals competing for the services of multiple agents.
Here, applying the concept of Rayo and Becker (2007), an agent’s reference point is endoge-
nously determined by the equilibrium conditions in the market. When focusing on a particular
principal-agent pair, however, both the principal and the agent take the reference point as ex-
ogenously given. An exogenous reference point, however, does not always seem plausible. In
particular, empirical evidence suggests that expectations matter in pinning down a person’s ref-
erence point, that is, the reference point is forward looking and depends on the distributions
of outcomes.2 Starting out from this premise, De Meza and Webb (2007) consider endogenous
formulations of the reference point. Pointing out that “making reference income equal to the
certainty equivalent [of the income distribution as proposed in Gul (1991)] does yield some ques-
tionable implications”,3 they propose that the reference income is the median income. This
captures the idea that the agent incurs a loss at all incomes for which it is odds-on that a higher
income would be drawn, and thus the focus is shifted to probabilities. While we subscribe to
the point of view that expectations are an important factor when it comes to the determination
of a decision maker’s reference point, median income suﬀers from the obvious drawback that it
is discontinuous in the underlying probability distribution.4 Consequently we apply the concept
of reference-dependent preferences introduced by K˝ oszegi and Rabin (2006), which pursues this
road most consistently: the reference point is fully determined by the rational expectations of the
decision maker. To the best of our knowledge Daido and Itoh (2007) is the only paper that also
applies this most recent concept of reference dependence to a principal-agent setting.While very
similar to our model from a conceptual perspective, the focus of Daido and Itoh greatly diﬀers
from ours. Applying the basic framework of K˝ oszegi and Rabin (2006), two types of self-fulﬁlling
prophecy are explained, the Galatea and the Pygmalion eﬀects.5 To capture these to eﬀects,
Daido and Itoh depart from the concept of reference-dependent preferences provided by K˝ oszegi
and Rabin, ﬁrst by ﬁxing the agent’s expectations exogenously by assuming that the agent’s
inherent type is either optimistic or pessimistic, and secondly by incorporating the principal’s
expectations explicitly into the agent’s preferences. Our analysis, on the other hand, consistently
follows through with the concept of K˝ oszegi and Rabin. We ﬁnd that - due to the agent’s loss
aversion - the principal may face implementation problems that are by far more severe than in
the standard case without reference-dependent preferences. In a seemingly innocuous footnote
Daido and Itoh restrict the model parameters, in particular those characterizing the agent’s
2See Mellers et al. (1999), Breiter et al. (2001), and Medvec et al (1995).
3De Meza and Webb (2007) consider to otherwise identical agents who diﬀer only in their degree of loss
aversion. They point out that with the certainty equivalent as reference point, there are situations
where the less loss-averse agent experiences a loss but the more loss-averse agent does not.
4For example, suppose with probability .51 a manager earns $1m and with probability .49 he earns $2m.
With median income as reference point the manager will never suﬀer a loss because his reference
income is $1m. A small shift in probabilities, however, makes the median income equal to $2m . Now
the agent suﬀers a loss in almost 50% of all cases.
5Roughly spoken, the former eﬀect refers to empirical ﬁndings that an agent’s self-expectation about his
performance is an important determinant of his actual performance, whereas the latter eﬀect refers
to the phenomenon that a principal’s expectation about the agent’s performance has an impact on
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degree of loss aversion, in a way that rules out that these kind of implementation problems
arise. This a priori restriction, however, is at odds with empirical evidence, a point that we will
comment on in more detail in the next section. With these implementation problems being an
issue for reasonable degrees of loss aversion and in particular when the performance measure is
informative, we consider this aspect as interesting and noteworthy in its own right. Dittmann
et al. (2007), Iantchev (2005), and De Meza and Webb (2007) all ﬁnd that the optimal contract
includes a nontrivial region where compensation does not vary with performance, but that pay
is smoothly increasing as soon as performance exceeds some threshold level.6 This ﬁnding is
interpreted as providing a rationale for frequently observed compensation schemes - in particu-
lar for CEOs - consisting of a base salary and stock options. As Prendergast (1999) points out,
however, “some employers prefer to avoid pay-for-performance altogether.” Though in a highly
stylized way, our analysis gives a possible explanation for why various labor contracts refrain
from providing incentives and instead pay a ﬁxed wage: Due to loss aversion it may quite simply
not be possible to motivate an agent to work harder by monetary payments.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we brieﬂy review the concepts of
reference-dependent preferences and choice acclimating personal equilibrium as introduced by
K˝ oszegi and Rabin (2006, forthcoming). The basic model is presented in Section 3. Section
4 contains the analysis: implementation problems and the optimal contract are characterized,
and strategic ignorance as a remedy for implementation problems is discussed. Section 5 shows
robustness of our results to relaxing particular functional assumptions of the basic model or to
the use of preferred personal equilibrium as solution concept. The ﬁnal section concludes.
2 Agent’s Preferences: A Model of Loss Aversion
We adopt the model of reference depending preferences or loss aversion developed by K˝ oszegi
and Rabin (2006, forthcoming). Their loss aversion model has three crucial features. First, a
person’s overall utility has two components, classic consumption utility and gain-loss utility.7
Secondly, the reference point is endogenously determined by the economic environment, which
allows little arbitrariness in modeling choice. Thirdly, the reference point has not necessarily to
be a single point, the formulation allows for a stochastic reference “lottery”.
A person’s utility for a riskless outcome is u(x|r), where x =( x1,...,x L) ∈ RL is a consump-
tion vector and r =( r1,...,r L) ∈ RL is a vector of “reference levels” of consumption. If x is
drawn according to the probability measure F and the person’s reference point is the probability
measure G over RL, then her expected utility is
U(F|G)=

u(x|r)dG(r)dF(x) .
This formulation captures the notion that the sense of gain or loss from a given consumption
outcome derives from comparing it to all outcomes possible under the reference lottery.
As mentioned above, overall utility has two components, consumption utility or intrinsic utility
m(x) on the one hand, and gain-loss utility n(x|r) on the other hand. Formally, u(x|r)=m(x)+
6There are, however, diﬀerences in whether or not the optimal contract includes punishment (“sticks”)
for very poor performance or where in the wage schedule the optimal contract features discontinuities.
7This is in contrast to the prospect theory model developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Their
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n(x|r). Furthermore, K˝ oszegi and Rabin assume that both intrinsic utility and the gain-loss
utility are additively separable across dimensions, that is, u(x|r)=
 L
l=1 ml(xl)+
 L
l=1 nl(xl|rl).
Additionally, they assume that how a person feels about gaining or loosing in a dimension
depends in a universal way on the changes in consumption utility associated with such gains or
losses: nl(xl|rl) ≡ μ(ml(xl) − ml(rl)) where μ(·) is the universal gain-loss function.
In general, it is assumed that the gain-loss function μ(·) has the following properties.8
(A0) μ(z) is continuous for all z twice diﬀerentiable for z  =0a n dμ(0) = 0.
(A1) μ(z) is strictly increasing.
(A2) If y>z>0, then μ(y)+μ(−y) <μ (z)+μ(−z).
(A3) μ  (z) ≤ 0f o rz>0a n dμ  (z) ≥ 0f o rx<0.
(A4)
limz→0 μ (−|z|)
limz→0μ (|z|)
≡ λ>1 .
(A0) is a purely technical assumption. (A2) and (A4) capture loss aversion for large stakes
and small stakes, respectively. (A3) represents diminishing sensitivity. For characterizing the
implications of loss aversion without diminishing sensitivity as force of behavior, K˝ oszegi and
Rabin deﬁne the following alternative to (A3), which we adopt for the most part of the paper
(A3 ) For all z  =0 ,μ   (z)=0 .
Following K˝ oszegi and Rabin (forthcoming) the reference point is determined by the agent’s ra-
tional expectations over outcomes. K˝ oszegi and Rabin deﬁne the concept of a choice-acclimating
personal equilibrium (CPE) for situations in which outcomes are resolved long after all decisions
are committed to, a situation that ﬁts well to principal-agent relationships.9,10 Typically, projects
are ﬁnished long before they are evaluated. For instance a consultant is employed to work out
a concept how the ﬁrm can improve customers’ satisfactory. Then the consultant works on his
proposal for a few month, the success of his work can only be evaluated earliest a half year
after the ﬁrm has tried to implement the proposals. The reference point is then the person’s
expectations held recently after choosing the outcome relevant actions. A formal deﬁnition of
the CPE is provided in the model section.
At this point we want to pause in order to comment on the statement made in the introduction
regarding the restriction of model parameters made by Daido and Itoh (2007). With respect
to the agent’s degree of loss aversion they assume that λ ≈ 2. At ﬁrst glance, this might
seem plausible: In the original formulation of loss aversion according to Tversky and Kahneman
(1979), utility is assumed to be entirely determined by gains and losses. In this case the empirical
evidence reporting 2:1 loss aversion implies that λ ≈ 2.11 When incorporating intrinsic utility
8The assumptions correspond (implicitly) to Kahneman and Tversky’s assumption about their value
function. These assumptions were formally stated ﬁrst by Bowman, Minehart and Rabin (1999).
9Except for the reference point being speciﬁed as a complete distribution rather than a certainty equiva-
lent, this concept is similar to the disappointment-aversion models of Bell(1985), Loomes and Sugden
(1986), and Gul (1991).
10K˝ oszegi and Rabin (2006) deﬁne also a diﬀerent equilibrium concept, namely the concept of a preferred
personal equilibrium (PPE). In Section 5.3, we also discuss the PPE concept in our principal-agent
framework.
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into the overall utility function, on the other hand, conventional 2:1 loss aversion translates into
λ ≈ 3.12 According to De Meza and Webb (2007),“empirical tests suggest that people commonly
value losses from two to four or more times their valuation of equal gains”, which would imply
an even larger value of λ.13 Moreover, and here we are jumping ahead, whether λ is greater or
less than 2 turns out to be a crucial determinant of whether implementation problems do arise
or not. For these reasons, the assumption made by Daido and Itoh does not seem very sensible.
3 The Model
There are two parties, a principal and an agent. The principal oﬀers a one-period employment
contract to the agent. If the agent accepts the contract, then he chooses an eﬀort level a ∈ [0,1].
The agent’s action a equals the probability that the principal receives a beneﬁt B>0. The
principal’s expected net beneﬁt is
π = aB − E[W] ,
where W is the compensation payment the principal pays to the agent. The principal is assumed
to be risk and loss neutral, thus she maximizes π. Our focus is on characterizing the optimal
contract to implement a certain action ˆ a ∈ (0,1) and not on the optimal action.14 Therefore,
the speciﬁc functional form of π is not essential for the analysis.
The agent is loss averse and consequently also risk averse in the sense that he would always
reject a fair gamble. His utility has two dimensions. The ﬁrst dimension is money and the
second dimension is eﬀort cost. It is assumed that the agent’s intrinsic utility for money is
linear, i.e. m(w)=w. The agent’s intrinsic disutility of working is a quadratic function of
eﬀort, i.e. m(a)=−(k/2)a2 with k>0. We assume that the gain-loss function is step-wise
linear,
μ(x)=
 
x, for x ≥ 0
λx, for x<0
,
where λ>1 is the weight put on losses. The weight on gains is normalized to one. For λ =1
the agent has a standard risk-neutral utility function. Furthermore, the agent has an outside
employment opportunity (or reservation utility) yielding expected utility ¯ u.
The action choice a ∈ [0,1] is private information of the agent and not observable for the prin-
cipal. Furthermore, it is assumed that the realization of B is not directly observable. A possible
interpretation is that B corresponds to a complex good whose quality cannot be determined by
a court, thus a contract cannot depend on the realization of B. Instead of observing the agent’s
12Remember that utility from consuming bundle x when the reference point is r is given by u(x|r)=
 L
l=1 ml(xl)+
 L
l=1 nl(xl|rl). The conventional estimate of 2:1 loss aversion in the l-th dimension of
the consumption bundle then implies
limclrl du(c|r)/dcl
limclrl du(c|r)/dcl = λ+1
2 ≈ 2
1. It is readily veriﬁed that this is
satisﬁed for λ ≈ 3.
13See, for example, Kahneman et al. (1990), Tversky and Kahneman (1991), Kachelmeier and Shehata
(1992), and Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988).
14We restrict attention to implementation of actions strictly between zero and one. Implementing a =0
can be achieved by not contracting with the agent at all. Implementing a = 1 is equivalent to B being
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action a or whether the beneﬁt B was realized or not, the principal observes a contractible bi-
nary measure of performance, with s ∈{ 0,1} being the realization of the performance measure
or the signal. Let γH and (1−γH) denote the probabilities of observing signal s =1a n ds =0 ,
respectively, conditional on B being realized. Accordingly, γL and (1−γL) are the probabilities
of observing signal s =1a n ds = 0, respectively, conditional on B not being realized. Therefore,
the whole informational content of the performance measure can be condensed into the tupel of
parameters (γH,γL)=ˆ γ. With this notation the unconditional probability of observing signal
s =1f o rag i v e na c t i o na is γ(a) ≡ aγH +( 1− a)γL.
Assumption 1 1 ≥ γH >γ L ≥ 0 .
Assuming that γH  = γL just says that the performance measure is informative about the agent’s
action. Furthermore, it is readily veriﬁed that under Assumption 1 the unconditional probability
of observing s =1 ,γ(a), is strictly increasing in the agent’s action, whereas the unconditional
probability of observing s =0 ,1− γ(a), is strictly decreasing in the agent’s action. With s =1
being more likely to be observed the higher the agent’s eﬀort, which in turn makes it more likely
that B is realized, we refer to s = 1 as the “good” signal and to s = 0 as the “bad” signal. Note
that, if γH =1a n dγL = 0, then observing the performance measure is equivalent to observing
whether B was realized or not. The contract which the principal oﬀers to the agent consists of
a payment for each realization of the performance measure. With only two possible signals to
be observed, the contract takes the form of a bonus contract
W =
 
w, if s =0
w + b, if s =1
,
where w ∈ R denotes the base wage and b ∈ R the bonus payment.15
The timing is as follows:
1) The principal makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer (w,b) to the agent.
2) The agent either accepts or rejects the contract. If the agent rejects the contract the game
ends and each party receives her/his reservation payoﬀ. If the agent accepts the contract
the game moves to the next stage.
3) The agent chooses an eﬀort ˆ a and forms rational expectations about the monetary out-
comes. The agent’s rational expectations about the realization of the performance measure
determine his reference point.
4) Both parties observe the realization of the performance measure and payments are made
a c c o r d i n gt ot h ec o n t r a c t .
The timing of the game is related to the equilibrium concept applied in this paper to solve the
behavior of the loss averse agent. K˝ oszegi and Rabin (forthcoming) develop the concept of a
choice-acclimating personal equilibrium (CPE) for situations with delayed consequences. This
seems well suited for a principal-agent relationship for often the evaluation of a project is not
15The restriction (w,b) ∈ R2 seems plausible since it prevents the principal from rewarding the agent
according to lotteries created out of thin air, like paying the agent according to a dice throw, a coin
ﬂip, or whether the sun shines or not. In a later section, however, we comment on this assumption.Term Paper Moral Hazard and Loss Aversion 8
possible immediately after the agent ﬁnishes working on that problem, but takes place at a
later point in time. Before deﬁning the choice-acclimating personal equilibrium it is useful to
write down the agent’s expected utility. Suppose the agent has expected to choose action ˆ a and
chooses action a, then his expected utility ex-ante is
E[U(a|ˆ a)] = (1 − γ(a))[w + γ(ˆ a)μ(0 − b) − (k/2)a2 +( k/2)μ(−a2 +ˆ a2)]
+ γ(a)[w + b +( 1− γ(ˆ a))μ(b − 0) − (k/2)a2 +( k/2)μ(−a2 +ˆ a2)] .
With probability (1−γ(a)) the agent receives only the base wage, however, with probability γ(ˆ a)
he has expected to receive the base wage plus the bonus. On the other hand, with probability
γ(a) the agent receives the base wage plus the bonus but has expected to receive only the base
wage with probability (1−γ(ˆ a)). In a choice-acclimating personal equilibrium the agent chooses
an action such that his expected utility ex-ante is maximized. The agent takes fully into account
that his action choice determines his expectations and therefore his reference point.
Deﬁnition 1 The action ˆ a ∈ [0,1] is a choice-acclimating personal equilibrium (CPE) if
E[U(ˆ a|ˆ a)] ≥ E[U(a|a)] for all a ∈ [0,1].
The crucial point is that the agent’s action choice determines his reference point. Therefore the
agent might have reasonings like “When I put in much eﬀort then I really expect to receive the
bonus and I’ll be very disappointed when the bad signal is realized. Thus, maybe I shouldn’t
spend much eﬀort in the ﬁrst place, because then I do not expect to receive the bonus and
consequently I won’t be disappointed”. Note that when the CPE is applied the agent’s expected
and actual eﬀort choice literally coincide so there is neither a gain nor a loss in the eﬀort
dimension.
As a benchmark case consider a situation where there is no incentive problem, that is, the
principal can contract upon the agent’s action choice directly. A loss averse agent dislikes
gambles, he is risk averse in some sense. The agent’s utility is his expected wage payment minus
eﬀort cost minus a strictly negative term as long as the payment scheme allows for deviations
from the agent’s reference point. The payment always equals the reference point only when there
is no uncertainty in monetary outcomes. Consequently, in absence of the incentive problem it is
optimal for the principal to pay a ﬁxed wage. The following remark characterizes the optimal
contract to implement a certain action ˆ a ∈ (0,1) for the benchmark case of observable actions.
Remark 1 Suppose a is observable and contractible. Then the action ˆ a ∈ (0,1) can be im-
plemented with the ﬁrst-best contract that pays wFB =¯ u +( k/2)ˆ a2 if a =ˆ a and wFB =0if
a  =ˆ a.
4T h eA n a l y s i s
4.1 Implementation Problems
Suppose that the principal sets a nonnegative bonus, b ≥ 0.16 Under CPE as equilibrium
concept, the agent’s expectations incorporate the implications of his eﬀort choice. Therefore
16A priori this assumption may seem restrictive, but the choice of a nonnegative bonus turns out to
be optimal. As we show later in this section, there is nothing to be gained for the principal by
setting a negative bonus, neither from an implementation-point-of-view nor from a minimum-cost-of-
implementation-perspective.Term Paper Moral Hazard and Loss Aversion 9
there is no gain-loss-component in the cost dimension and expected utility from choosing eﬀort
level a is
E [U(a)] = w + γ(a)b − γ(a)(1 − γ(a))(λ − 1)b −
k
2
a2. (1)
One component of expected utility is the agent’s net intrinsic utility from choosing eﬀort level a,
that is, expected wage payment minus eﬀort cost, w+γ(a)b−(k/2)a2. Moreover, with expected
losses looming larger than equally sized gains, in expectation the agent suﬀers from deviations
from his reference point. While the strength of this eﬀect is determined by the degree of the
agent’s loss aversion, λ, his action choice - together with the signal parameters - determines
the probability that such a deviation from the reference point actually occurs. We refer to this
probability, which is given by γ(a)(1 − γ(a)), as loss probability. Therefore, when choosing his
action, the agent has to balance oﬀ the drive to maximize expected net utility with the want to
minimize the loss probability. Note that for λ = 1 the agent’s expected utility only comprises of
expected wage payments minus eﬀort cost. The ﬁrst derivative of expected utility with respect
to eﬀort is given by
dE [U(a)]
da
=( γH − γL)b[2 − λ +2 γ(a)(λ − 1)]
      
MB(a)
− ka     
MC(a)
.
While the marginal cost, MC(a), obviously is a straight line through the origin with slope k,
the marginal beneﬁt, MB(a), also is a positively sloped, linear function of eﬀort a:
MB(a)=b(γH − γL)
 
2 − λ +2 γL(λ − 1)
 
+2 b(γH − γL)2.(λ − 1)a
An increase in b unambiguously makes MB(a) steeper. The intercept of MB(a)w i t ht h e
horizontal axis, a0, is completely determined by the parameters of the model:
a0 =
λ − 2 − 2γL(λ − 1)
2(γH − γL)(λ − 1)
.
Therefore, the model parameters provide three cases to be taken into account: a0 < 0, a0 =0 ,
and a0 > 0. The case for a0 < 0 is depicted graphically in Figure 1. Implementation problems in
our sense refer to a situation where there are actions a ∈ (0,1) that are not incentive compatible
for any bonus payment. As we will see, implementation problems arise whenever a0 > 0, whereas
for a0 ≤ 0 each eﬀort level is implementable. Note that for γL ≥ 1/2o rλ ≤ 2 we always have
a0 < 0. For γL < 1/2, on the other hand, a0 < 0 if and only if λ<2(1 − γL)/(1 − 2γL). Before
turning to each of the above cases, however, for future reference we provide the second derivative
of expected utility with respect to eﬀort:
d2E [U(a)]
da2 =2 b(γH − γL)2(λ − 1) − k.
Case 1: a0 < 0
For ˆ a to be a zero of dE [U(a)]/da, the bonus has to be chosen according to
b∗(ˆ a)=
kˆ a
(γH − γL)[2− λ +2 γ(ˆ a)(λ − 1)]
.
For a>a 0, b∗(a) is a strictly increasing and strictly concave function of a with b∗(0) = 0. Hence,
each ˆ a ∈ [0,1] can be made a zero of dE [U(a)]/da with a nonnegative bonus. For the eﬀort levelTerm Paper Moral Hazard and Loss Aversion 10
a
MC(a)
MB(a)
a0
Figure 1: MB(a)a n dMC(a)f o ra0 < 0.
ˆ a to be chosen by the agent, this eﬀort level has to satisfy the following incentive compatibility
constraint:
ˆ a ∈ arg max
a∈[0,1]
w + γ(a)b − γ(a)(1 − γ(a))b(λ − 1) −
k
2
a2 (IC)
By choosing the bonus according to b∗(ˆ a), ˆ a satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order condition for optimal-
ity that corresponds to the above incentive compatibility constraint. Inserting b∗(ˆ a)i n t ot h e
d2E [U(a)]/da2 shows that expected utility is strictly concave function if a0 < 0. Hence, with
the bonus set equal to b∗(ˆ a), eﬀort level ˆ a satisﬁes the second-order condition for optimality
and therefore is incentive compatible. The base wage is chosen in order to satisfy the agent’s
participation constraint,
w + γ(ˆ a)b∗(ˆ a)+γ(ˆ a)(1 − γ(ˆ a))b∗(ˆ a) − (1 − γ(ˆ a))γ(ˆ a)λb∗(ˆ a) −
k
2
ˆ a2 ≥ ¯ u, (PC)
with equality,17 and therefore is given by
w∗(ˆ a)=¯ u +
k
2
ˆ a2 − γ(ˆ a)b∗(ˆ a)[2− λ + γ(ˆ a)(λ − 1)].
Before moving on to to the case where a0 = 0, we provide and brieﬂy discuss the comparative
statics of the optimal bonus.
Remark 2 Let a0 < 0. The optimal bonus to implement action ˆ a has the following properties:
db(ˆ a)
dˆ a
> 0;
db(ˆ a)
dλ
 0;
db(ˆ a)
dγH < 0;
db(ˆ a)
dγL  0.
Proof: See Appendix.
While it is little surprising that implementing a higher action requires a larger bonus, the
fact that the optimal bonus to implement a certain action ˆ a may decrease or increase as the
agent’s degree of loss aversion increases is somewhat unexpected. Remember, however, that the
17If the base wage was chosen such that (PC) holds with strict inequality, then the principal could
reduce w until the participation constraint binds, thereby increasing her payoﬀ while incentives remain
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agent has two objectives when choosing his action: maximizing expected net intrinsic utility and
minimizing the loss probability. The more loss averse the agent, the more important becomes
the latter objective. Hence, if increasing eﬀort reduces the loss probability, an increase in λ may
lead to the agent choosing a higher eﬀort level.18,19 In this case, in order to keep eﬀort at level
ˆ a, the principal has to counterbalance the increase in loss aversion by decreasing the bonus. The
eﬀect of an increase in γH on the bonus is just like in the “classic” case without loss aversion:
with the eﬀect of eﬀort on the probability to receive the bonus becoming larger, the agent wants
to choose a higher action. In order to leave incentives unchanged, the principal has to lower the
bonus payment. Last, due to the complex interplay of the agent’s urge to maximize expected
net intrinsic utility on the one hand, and to minimize the loss probability on the other hand,
the eﬀect of an increase in γL on the optimal bonus to implement action ˆ a is undetermined.
Case 2: a0 =0
Just like in the case where a0 < 0, each eﬀort level a ∈ [0,1] turns out to be implementable with
a nonnegative bonus. To see this, consider bonus
b0 =
k
2(γH − γL)2(λ − 1)
.
For b ≤ b0, dE [U(a)]/da < 0f o re a c ha>0, that is, lowering eﬀort increases expected utility.
Hence, the agent wants to choose an eﬀort level as low as possible and therefore exerts no eﬀort
at all. If, on the other hand, b>b 0,t h e ndE [U(a)]/da > 0. Now, increasing eﬀort increases
expected utility, and the agent wants to choose eﬀort as high as possible. For b = b0, expected
utility is constant over all a ∈ [0,1], that is, as long as his participation constraint is satisﬁed, the
agent is indiﬀerent which eﬀort level to choose. The base wage which satisﬁes this participation
constraint with equality is given by
w0 =¯ u +
k(γL)2
2(γH − γL)2.
As a tie-breaking rule we assume that, if indiﬀerent between several eﬀort levels, the agent
chooses the eﬀort level that the principal prefers.20 With the case a0 = 0 obviously being a
knife-edge case, we refrain from a detailed discussion of comparative static results.
Case 3: a0 > 0
If a0 > 0, the agent either chooses a =0o ra = 1. To see this, again consider bonus b0.F o r
b ≤ b0, dE [U(a)]/da < 0f o re a c ha>0. Hence, the agent wants to exert as little eﬀort as
possible and chooses a = 0. If, on the other hand, b>b 0,t h e nd2E [U(a)]/da2 > 0, that is,
expected utility is a strictly convex function of eﬀort. In order to maximize expected utility, the
agent will choose either a =0o ra = 1 depending on whether E [U(0)] exceeds E [U(1)] or not.
18As we show in the Appendix, db(ˆ a)/dλ < 0 if and only if 1 − 2γ(ˆ a) < 0. Note that 1 − 2γ(ˆ a) < 0j u s t
says that at ˆ a the loss probability is decreasing in eﬀort. Hence it is not that surprising that, given
bonus b(ˆ a), the agent’s optimal action is increasing in λ if and only if 1 − 2γ(a) < 0. This last result
is obtained by implicitly diﬀerentiating the ﬁrst-order condition that determines the agent’s action
choice for a given bonus.
19This probably is what K˝ oszegi and Rabin had in mind when reasoning that under loss aversion the
agent’s motivation goes beyond pure monetary incentives.
20Even though the agent is indiﬀerent which eﬀort level to choose, this will not be the case for the
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Before providing an intuition why these implementation problems arise in the ﬁrst place, we
summarize the above ﬁndings in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Eﬀort level ˆ a ∈ (0,1) is implementable with a nonnegative bonus if and only if
a0 ≤ 0.F o ra0 < 0 the optimal contract that implements ˆ a with a nonnegative bonus is of the
form (w∗(ˆ a),b ∗(ˆ a)).F o ra0 =0 , the only contract that implements ˆ a ∈ (0,1) with a nonnegative
bonus is of the form (w0,b 0).
The principal faces implementation problems in our sense when he is not able to motivate the
agent to choose each and every action action ˆ a ∈ (0,1) by setting the appropriate bonus. These
implementation problems arise when γL < 1/2a n dλ>2(1−γL)/(1−2γL). Somewhat surpris-
ingly, this includes performance measures with γL < 1/2 <γ H which are precise in the intuitive
sense that if beneﬁt B was not realized it is more likely to observe the bad signal, whereas if B was
realized it is more likely to observe the good signal. So, why do these implementation problems
arise in the ﬁrst place? Remember that the agent has two targets: First, as in classic models, he
seeks to maximize net intrinsic utility, w+bγ(a)−(k/2)a2. When the agent cares only about this
net intrinsic utility (e.g., he is loss neutral) then each action can be implemented by choosing a
suﬃciently high bonus. Due to loss aversion, however, the agent’s expected overall utility has an
additional negative component, the gain-loss term −γ(a)(1−γ(a))(λ−1)b. Therefore the agent
has a second target which is minimizing the expected loss. How can the agent pursue this goal?
He can do so by choosing an action such that the loss probability, γ(a)(1−γ(a)), becomes small.
The crucial point is that these two targets, maximizing net intrinsic utility and minimizing the
loss probability, may conﬂict with each other in the sense that an increase in eﬀort may increase
net intrinsic utility but at the same time also increases the loss probability. First of all note
that implementation problems never arise when γL ≥ 1/2o rλ ≤ 2. For γL ≥ 1/2, the loss
probability is strictly decreasing in the agent’s action. Consequently, with both targets of the
agent being aligned, an increase in the bonus unambiguously leads to an increase in the agent’s
action: A higher bonus increases the marginal beneﬁt of eﬀort, so the agent has an incentive to
choose a higher action in order to maximize net intrinsic utility. Moreover, with an increase in
the bonus leading to an increase in the expected loss, the agent can counteract this eﬀect by de-
creasing the loss probability by choosing a higher action. For λ ≤ 2, the weight put on gain-loss
utility, λ − 1, is lower than the weight put on intrinsic utility, so the agent is more interested
in maximizing net intrinsic utility than in minimizing the loss probability. With loss aversion
being of only little importance, an increase in the bonus therefore always leads to an increase
in eﬀort, irrespective of whether the loss probability locally increases or decreases in the agent’s
action. For γL < 1/2, on the other hand, implementation problems do arise when the agent
is suﬃciently loss averse. Roughly spoken, being suﬃciently loss averse, the agent primarily
cares about reducing the loss probability, which - being a strictly concave function of eﬀort - in
turn is minimized by one of the two extreme actions a ∈{ 0,1}. Therefore, the principal cannot
motivate the agent to choose an action ˆ a ∈ (0,1) when γL < 1/2 and the agent’s loss aversion
is suﬃciently severe. More precisely, consider a situation with implementation problems, that
is, suppose a0 > 0. Irrespective of the bonus payment, the agent’s marginal beneﬁt from eﬀort
is negative for low eﬀort levels. Formally, MB(a) ≤ 0 for all a ∈ [0,a 0]. Hence, in order to gain
at least something from his eﬀort, the agent has to choose a>a 0. For this to be worthwhile,
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increasing marginal cost. Therefore, for too low a bonus, the agent is inert to move away from
the least cost action. Hence, in order to force the agent away from this least cost action, the
principal has to pay a suﬃciently high bonus. This, however, makes the agent’s expected overall
utility a convex function of the eﬀort choice. Thus, with minimizing the expected loss being
a suﬃciently important target, if not choosing the least cost action the agent switches to the
other extreme, choosing a =1 . 21 In contrast, when there are no implementation problems, e.g.
a0 ≤ 0, the marginal beneﬁt of eﬀort is positive for all a ≥ 0. Therefore, by setting the bonus
slightly above zero the principal can implement even low actions. Furthermore, in this case all
actions ˆ a ∈ (0,1) can be implemented. The bonus the principal has to set even for ˆ a close to one
is suﬃciently low such that agent’s utility is a concave function in his action choice. It should
be noticed that when the principal can contract upon the realization of B directly, she faces
implementation problems when λ is slightly above two. Experimental ﬁndings suggest that λ
is between two and four. Therefore, the implementation problems are not an artifact that can
occur only for unreasonable high degrees of loss aversion.
According to Proposition 1 there may be situations where, due to the agent’s loss aversion,
the principal is not able to motivate the agent by relying purely on monetary incentives. When
contracting with the agent is suﬃciently valuable for the principal even when the agent chooses
the least cost action, then paying a ﬁxed wage is optimal. In reality, ﬁxed wage labor con-
tracts are commonly observed even in situations where performance of employees is observable
and measurable. By showing the feebleness of monetary incentives, the above analysis provides
an explanation for the widely-used practice of ﬁxed wages. Moreover, this highlights the im-
portance of nonmonetary incentives, like company parties or works outings in order to promote
identiﬁcation of the employees with ﬁrm, and thereby increasing their willingness to exert eﬀort.
4.2 Minimum Cost of Implementation and Comparative Statics
The preceding analysis identiﬁed the optimal bonus and the corresponding base wage to imple-
ment action ˆ a given that the principal does not face implementation problems. Consider the
case a0 < 0 ﬁrst. The principal’s minimum (expected) cost of implementing eﬀort level ˆ a thus is
given by the sum of the base wage and the expected bonus payment, C(ˆ a)=w∗(ˆ a)+γ(ˆ a)b∗(ˆ a).
Substituting in the corresponding expressions for w∗(ˆ a)a n db∗(ˆ a) yields
C(ˆ a)=¯ u +
k
2
ˆ a2 +
kˆ aγ(ˆ a)(1 − γ(ˆ a))(λ − 1)
(γH − γL)[1− (1 − 2γ(ˆ a))(λ − 1)]
.
With the last term being strictly positive for all ˆ a>0, the principal’s minimum cost of imple-
mentation exceeds the ﬁrst-best cost of implementation for all eﬀort level except the least-cost
action. We summarize the comparative statics of the principal’s minimum cost of implementing
a certain action in the next proposition.
Proposition 2 Let a0 > 0. The principal’s minimum (expected) cost of implementing action ˆ a
has the following properties:
dC(ˆ a)
dˆ a
> 0;
dC(ˆ a)
dλ
> 0;
dC(ˆ a)
dγH < 0;
dC(ˆ a)
dγL  0.
21It can be shown, however, that if γH − γL ≤ (λ − 2)/(λ − 1), the agent will always prefer a =0o v e r
a = 1. In these cases, even if the principal wanted to implement a = 1, she is not able to do so.Term Paper Moral Hazard and Loss Aversion 14
Proof: See Appendix.
That the minimum cost of implementation increases with the action to be implemented is not
surprising: a higher action induces more eﬀort cost on the agent’s side for which he demands to
be compensated. Even though exerting higher eﬀort may beneﬁt the agent by possibly reducing
the loss probability, this eﬀect never outweighs the increase in eﬀort cost. While the eﬀect of an
increase in the agent’s degree of loss aversion on the optimal bonus is ambiguous, this is not the
case for the principal’s cost of implementation: the more loss averse the agent, the more costly
it is for the principal to implement a certain action. Hence, even if an increase in the agent’s
loss aversion may be helpful for creating incentives, the increase in the required base wage due
to a higher ‘loss premium’ more than outweighs this eﬀect. We have seen that an increase in
γH makes it easier for the principal to create incentives because her objective becomes more
congruent with the agent’s objective. This eﬀect carries over to overall implementation costs
in the sense that a higher γH makes it less costly to implement a certain action. The eﬀect of
an increase in γL on implementation cost, on the other hand, is undetermined. The interplay
of the agent’s two targets, maximizing net expected intrinsic utility and minimizing the loss
probability, may play out in both directions, depending on model parameters and the action
which is to be implemented. And this last result is indeed surprising: Despite the performance
measure becoming less informative in the sense that observing the good signal in the case of the
beneﬁt B not being realized becomes more likely, the principal’s cost of implementing a certain
action may actually decrease.22
As we already mentioned, a0 = 0 is a knife-edge case. Therefore, for this case we content
ourselves with (more or less bluntly) presenting the comparative statics for the principal’s min-
imum cost of implementation, C0(ˆ a). Note that comparative statics with respect to λ and γL
make little sense because, all else equal, for even small changes in one of these parameters we
drop out of the case a0 = 0. For an increase in the eﬀort level which is to be implemented or an
increase the signal parameter γH on the minimum cost of implementation, the results from the
case a0 < 0 carry over, that is, dC0(ˆ a)/dˆ a>0a n ddC0(ˆ a)/dγH > 0.
4.3 Does Candy Work Better Than the Carrot?
So far we assumed that the principal chooses a nonnegative bonus, that is, she literally rewards
the agent in the case of a good signal. Now we want to answer the question whether she can
do better by consoling the agent for a bad signal by setting a strictly negative bonus. As it
turns out, this never is the case: punishing the agent for a good signal neither enlarges the set
22Note that the comparative statics of both optimal bonus and implementation cost with respect to λ,
γH and γL do not depend on the assumption of a quadratic eﬀort cost function but remain valid as
long as c (ˆ a) > 0. The reason is that k, the parameter characterizing the quadratic cost function,
for all ˆ a ∈ (0,1) can always be chosen such that c (ˆ a)=kˆ a. From the the ﬁrst-order condition that
determines the agent’s behavior it is immediately obvious that the optimal bonus to implement action
ˆ a remains the same as for quadratic eﬀort cost. The agent’s participation constraint, on the other
hand, changes to w ≥ ¯ u+c(ˆ a)−γ(ˆ a)b∗(ˆ a). This change, however, corresponds to a shift in the agent’s
reservation utility from ¯ u to ¯ ¯ u such that ¯ u+c(ˆ a)=¯ ¯ u+(k/2)ˆ a2. Thus, with eﬀort cost function c(a), the
minimum cost of implementing action ˆ a are given by C(ˆ a)=¯ ¯ u+(k/2)ˆ a2+b∗(ˆ a)γ(ˆ a)(1−γ(ˆ a))(λ−1).
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of implementable actions, nor does it lower the minimum cost of implementing a certain action.
Since the analysis exactly runs along the same lines as in the case of a nonnegative bonus, we
restrict ourselves to presenting the main steps but otherwise refrain from going into detail.
Let b− < 0 denote the monetary punishment that the agent receives if the good signal is
observed. The agent’s expected utility now is given by
E [U(a)] = w + γ(a)b− + γ(a)(1 − γ(a))λb− +( 1− γ(a))γ(a)(−b−) −
k
2
a2.
In this case, when receiving the negative bonus while expecting not to receive it leads to the
sensation of a loss of b−. Vice versa, not obtaining the negative bonus while expecting to be
punished makes the agent experience a gain of −b−. The ﬁrst derivative with respect to eﬀort,
dE [U(a)]
da
=( γH − γL)b− [λ − 2γ(a)(λ − 1)]
      
MB−(a)
− ka     
MC(a)
,
reveals that MB−(a) is a positively sloped function, which is the steeper the harsher the punish-
ment, that is, the more negative b−, is. It is worthwhile to point out that if bonus and punishment
are equal in absolute value, |b−| = b, then also the slopes of MB−(a)a n dMB(a) are identical.
The intercept of MB−(a) with the horizontal axis, a−
0 again is completely determined by the
model parameters:
a−
0 =
λ − 2γL(λ − 1)
2(γH − γL)(λ − 1)
Note that a−
0 > 0f o rγL ≤ 1/2. For γL > 1/2w eh a v ea−
0 < 0 if and only if λ>2γL/(2γL −1).
Proceeding in exactly the same way as in the preceding subsection yields familiar results: If
a−
0 < 0o ra−
0 =0 ,t h e ne a c he ﬀ o r tl e v e lˆ a ∈ [0,1] is implementable with a strictly negative
bonus chosen according to
b−(ˆ a)=
kˆ a
(γH − γL)[λ − 2γ(ˆ a)(λ − 1)]
in the ﬁrst case, and equal to
b−
0 = −
k
2(γH − γL)2(λ − 1)
in the latter case. In both cases the respective base wage is chosen in order to satisfy the
participation constraint
w + γ(ˆ a)b− + γ(ˆ a)(1 − γ(ˆ a))λb− +( 1− γ(ˆ a))γ(ˆ a)(−b−) −
k
2
ˆ a2 ≥ ¯ u
with equality, where b− ∈
 
b−(ˆ a),b −
0
 
.I f ,h o w e v e r ,a−
0 > 0 then the agent either exerts no eﬀort
at all or chooses the highest eﬀort level possible, depending on the parameter of the model and
how severe the punishment is. We summarize these ﬁndings in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Eﬀort level ˆ a ∈ (0,1) is implementable with a strictly negative bonus (punish-
ment) if and only if a−
0 ≤ 0.
At ﬁrst glance it may seem absurd that high eﬀort can be implemented by punishing a good
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identiﬁed by Gneezy et al. (2006). They ﬁnd that individuals sometimes value a risky prospect
less than its worst possible outcome, which is in contrast to the fundamental requirement imposed
by expected utility theory and prospect theory that the value of a risky prospect must lie between
the value of that prospect’s highest and lowest outcome. This behavioral ﬁnding, which is termed
the uncertainty eﬀect, suggests that people sometimes value a low outcome with certainty higher
than a risky lottery which comprises only - at least weakly - higher outcomes. And this is in
the spirit of our ﬁnding: the agent is willing to exert high eﬀort and thereby to increase the
probability of being punished for the sake of being exposed to - even positive - surprises less
often.
Propositions 1 and 3 have two interesting implications that were already brieﬂy mentioned:
choosing a negative bonus, that is, punishing the agent for a good signal, neither enlarges the
set of implementable actions nor does it lower the cost of implementing a certain eﬀort level. In
what follows we formally grasp and prove these statements.
Corollary 1 If eﬀort level ˆ a ∈ (0,1) is not implementable with a nonnegative bonus, then it is
not implementable with a strictly negative bonus.
Proof: Follows immediately from Propositions 1 and 3 and the fact that a0 <a −
0 .
Proposition 4 If eﬀort level ˆ a ∈ (0,1) is implementable with a strictly negative bonus, then the
minimum cost of implementing ˆ a with a nonnegative bonus is lower than the minimum cost of
implementing ˆ a with a strictly negative bonus.
Proof: See Appendix.
Hence, in the light of Corollary 1 and Proposition 4, restricting attention to nonnegative bonus
payments in our framework not only is in accordance with observed practice, but arises from
optimality considerations of the principal.
4.4 Turning a Blind Eye
As we have seen in the preceding analysis, the principal faces implementation problems whenever
a0 > 0 or, equivalently, whenever γL < 1/2a n dλ>2(1−γL)/(1−2γL) ≥ 2. One might wonder
if there is a remedy for these implementation problems. The answer is “yes”, there is a remedy,
and in fact a surprisingly simple one. While the principal may have a hard time trying to lower
the agent’s loss aversion, she can manipulate the signal in her favor by turning a blind eye
from time to time when she observes the bad signal. Formally, suppose the principal commits
herself to stochastically ignore the bad signal with probability p ∈ [0,1).23 Put diﬀerently, with
probability p the principal pays the bonus to the agent even when she receives a bad signal. Thus,
the overall probability of receiving the bonus is given by γt(a) ≡ γ(a)+p(1−γ(a)). This strategic
ignorance of information gives rise to a transformed performance measure ˆ γt =( γH
t ,γL
t ). As
before, γH
t denotes the probability that the bonus is paid to the agent conditional on beneﬁt
B being realized. This is the case when the realization of the original performance measure is
23Always ignoring the bad signal, i.e. setting p = 1, would be detrimental for incentives because then
the agent’s monetary payoﬀ is independent of his action. Hence, he would choose the least cost action
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s = 1 or when the realization of the original performance measure is s = 0 but is ignored by the
principal. Hence, γH
t = γH + p(1 − γH). Analogously, the probability of the bonus being paid
out conditional on B not being realized is given by γL
t = γL + p(1 − γL). It is readily veriﬁed
that under the transformed performance measure ˆ γt the intercept of the MB(a) function with
the horizontal axis,
a0t ≡
λ − 2 − 2
 
p +( 1− p)γL 
(λ − 1)
2(1 − p)(γH − γL)(λ − 1)
,
not only is decreasing in p but also can be made arbitrarily small, in particular, arbitrarily
negative. Formally, da0t/dp < 0 and limp→1 a0t = −∞. In the light of Proposition 2 this
immediately implies that the principal can eliminate any implementation problem by choosing
p suﬃciently high, that is, by turning a blind eye suﬃciently often.
Besides alleviating possible implementation problems, turning a blind eye on the bad signal
can also beneﬁt the principal from a cost perspective. Using the deﬁnition of γt(a)i tc a nb e
shown that the minimum cost of implementation of action a under the transformed performance
measure, Ct(a), takes the following form:
Ct(a)=u +
k
2
a2 +
ka(λ − 1)(1 − γ(a))
(γH − γL)
γ(a)+p(1 − γ(a))
1 − (λ − 1)[1 − 2γ(a) − 2p(1 − γ(a))]
Diﬀerentiating the principal’s cost with respect to p reveals that sign{dCt(a)/dp} =s i g n {2−λ}.
Hence, an increase in the probability of ignoring the bad signal decreases the cost of implementing
a certain action if and only if λ>2 . Note that there are never implementation problems when
λ ≤ 2. Whenever the principal turns a blind eye in order to remedy implementation problems,
he will do so to the largest possible extent.24,25 This is in the spirit of Becker and Stigler (1974)
who show that despite a small detection probability of malfeasance incentives can be maintained
if the punishment is suﬃciently severe. We summarize the preceding analysis in the following
proposition.
Proposition 5 Suppose the principal can commit herself to stochastically ignorance of the signal
s =0 . Then each action ˆ a ∈ [0,1] can be implemented. Moreover, the implementation costs are
strictly decreasing in p if and only if λ>2.
This ﬁnding is in stark contrast to the Informativeness Principle by Holmstr¨ om (1979), which
- loosely put - implies that each and every measure of performance should be included in the
compensation contract as long as it reveals information about the action chosen by the agent.
As Prendergast (1999) points out, however, “the most striking aspect of observed contracts is
that the Informativeness Principle [...] seems to be violated in many occupations.” One possible
explanation is provided by Holmstr¨ om and Milgrom (1991) in a multi-tasking framework with
a job being too complex to contract upon every activity that the agent carries out. Roughly
spoken, information may be ignored for contracting purposes if otherwise the agent shifts his
24Formally, for λ>2, the solution to the principal’s problem of choosing the optimal probability to turn
a blind eye, p∗, is not well deﬁned because p∗ → 1. Thus, if the agent is subject to limited liability or
there is a cost of ignorance, then p∗ → 1 may no longer be optimal.
25If the principal commits herself to stochastically ignore the good signal and to pay the bonus only if the
good signal is observed (but not in the case of ignorance), then one can show that (i) no implementation
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focus to the tasks that are included in the contract while neglecting those aspects which are
excluded from the contract. Our ﬁndings, on the other hand, provide yet another explanation
for strategic ignorance of information: turning a blind eye on the bad signal from time to time
helps to remedy implementation problems caused by loss aversion on the agent’s side.
With bad performance being ignored as a result of agents’ loss aversion, our analysis also
relates to a well documented ﬁnding in the personnel literature which has become known as
leniency bias. Leniency bias refers to a practice where supervisors overstate the performance
of their workers, resulting in a compression of performance ratings which is less variable than
actual performance.26 As Prendergast (1999) argues, “such compression need not be ineﬃcient
in a dynamic setting [...] [since] telling the workers that their performance was poor can easily
result in disappointment [...]. As a result, ﬁrms may prefer to reveal little information.” Our
analysis, however, suggests that such a compression of performance ratings may well be optimal
in a static framework when agents are loss averse.27
If the principal is restricted in her wage policy, for example due to liquidity constraints of the
agent, then maybe the harshest punishment possible is to dismiss the agent. As Prendergast
(1999) points out,“[...] themostimportantformofnonlinearity[inobservedcontracts]concerns
the threat of being ﬁred, where wages vary little with performance but where poor performance
is punished by dismissal.”In practice, dismissals are often observed during economic downturns,
but not during upturns. Moreover, according to Iantchev (2005), dismissals mainly concern
employees who performed poorly in the recent past. This is in line with our ﬁndings when the
principal uses the business situation as a randomization device: While the agent receives a ﬁxed
wage in general, he is ﬁred if the business situation is bad and he performed inadequately.
It may seem questionable that the principal can credibly commit himself to ignore the bad
signal after having observed the realization of the performance measure. As it turns out, ignoring
the bad signal with probability p is equivalent to not paying attention to the performance measure
at all with probability p.28 That the principal can commit himself to this type of ignorance is by
far easier to imagine. For example, if the performance measure literally has to be observed by
the principal, she can commit herself to do a suﬃciently high fraction of all calls on customers
herself, thereby being not always around to observe the performance measure.29
We restricted the principal to oﬀer non-stochastic payments conditional on which signal is
observed. If the principal was able to do just that, then he could remedy implementation
problems by paying the base wage plus a lottery in the case of the bad signal. For instance,
26Evidence for such compression is provided by Landy and Farr (1980), Mohrman and Lawler (1983),
Murphy and Cleveland (1991), and Larkey and Caulkins (1992).
27MacLeod (2003) presents another static framework in which such a compression of performance ratings
is not ineﬃcient but a feature of the optimal contract between a risk-neutral principal and a risk-averse
agent when rewards are based upon a subjective evaluation of performance.
28In this latter case, the agent receives the bonus when the performance measure is ignored, which
happens with probability p, or when the performance measure is not ignored and the good signal is
observed, which happens with probability (1 − p)γ(a). Hence, the overall probability of the bonus
being paid out is given by p+(1−p)γ(a) .O b v i o u s l yt h i si se q u i v a l e n tt oγt(a), the probability of the
bonus being paid to the agent if the principal turns a blind eye on the bad signal with probability p.
29Or, as probably everyone has experienced on his own, by giving his oﬃce phone number to her signiﬁcant
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when the lottery yields b with probability p and zero otherwise, this is as turning a blind eye.30
We conclude this section by brieﬂy pointing out an interesting implication of the above analy-
sis. Suppose the principal has no access to a randomization device, that is, turning a blind eye is
not possible. Then the above considerations allow a straight-forward comparison of performance
measures ˆ ζ =( ζH,ζL)a n dˆ γ =( γH,γL)i fˆ ζ is a convex combination of ˆ γ and 1 ≡ (1,1).
Corollary 2 Let ˆ ζ = p1 +( 1− p)ˆ γ with p ∈ (0,1). Then the principal at least weakly prefers
performance measure ˆ ζ to ˆ γ if and only if λ ≥ 2.
Proof: Let p ∈ (0,1). With ˆ ζ being a convex combination of ˆ γ and 1 we have (ζH,ζL)=
p(1,1)+(1−p)(γH,γL)=( γH+p(1−γH),γL+p(1−γL)). The desired result follows immediately
from Proposition 5. Consider λ>2. Implementation problems are less likely to be encountered
under ˆ ζ than under ˆ γ. Moreover, if implementation problems are not an issue under both
performance measures, then implementation of a certain action is less costly under ˆ ζ than under
ˆ γ.F o r λ = 2 implementation problems do not arise and implementation costs are identical
under both performance measures. Last, if λ<2, implementation problems are not an issue
under either performance measure, but the cost of implementation is strictly lower under ˆ γ than
under ˆ ζ.
The ﬁnding that the principal prefers the “garbled” performance measure ˆ ζ over performance
measure ˆ γ seems to be at odds with Blackwell’s theorem. To see that this indeed is the case,
let performance measures ˆ γ and ˆ ζ be characterized, respectively, by the stochastic matrices
P γ =
 
1 − γH γH
1 − γL γL
 
and P ζ =
 
1 − ζH ζH
1 − ζL ζL
 
.
According to Blackwell’s theorem, any decision maker prefers information system ˆ γ to ˆ ζ if and
only if there exists a non-negative stochastic matrix M with
 
j mij =1s u c ht h a tP ζ = P γM.31
It is readily veriﬁed that this matrix M exists and takes the form
M =
 
1 − pp
01
 
.
Thus, even though comparison of the two performance measures according to Blackwell’s theo-
rem implies that the principal should prefer ˆ γ over ˆ ζ, the principal actually prefers the“garbled”
information system ˆ ζ over information system ˆ γ. While Kim (1995) has already shown that the
necessary part of Blackwell’s theorem does not hold in the agency model, the suﬃciency part
was proved to be applicable to the agency framework by Gjesdal (1982) and Grossman and Hart
(1983). Our ﬁndings, however, show that this is not the case anymore when agents are loss
averse.
30In this case, the agent receives the bonus when the good signal is observed, which happens with
probability γ(a), or when the bad signal is observed and the realization of the lottery is b,w h i c h
happens with probability (1 − γ(a))p. Hence, the overall probability of the bonus being paid out is
given by γ(a)+( 1− γ(a))p, which is nothing but γt(a) from turning a blind eye on the bad signal.
31See Blackwell (1951, 1953).Term Paper Moral Hazard and Loss Aversion 20
5 Robustness Checks
5.1 Non-quadratic Cost Function
So far we have assumed that the agent’s eﬀort cost is a quadratic function of his eﬀort choice,
which in turn implies a linear marginal cost function. In this section we want to emphasize that
the implementation problems which we identiﬁed in the preceding analysis do not depend on
this particular functional assumption. Discussing each and every possible shape of the eﬀort
cost function is far beyond the scope of our paper. We restrict our discussion of implementation
problems to monotone increasing and continuous marginal eﬀort cost functions that are either
strictly concave or strictly convex. Moreover we assume that the functional value of these
marginal cost functions is zero when the agent exerts no eﬀort at all. The reasoning, however,
is readily transfered to other cost functions.
a aMax a  a0
MC(a)
MBI(a)
MBII(a)
Figure 2: Concave marginal cost.
a a  aMin a0
MC(a)
MBI(a)
MBII(a)
Figure 3: Convex marginal cost.
Figure 2 depicts the case of a concave marginal cost function. Just like in the case of quadratic
eﬀort costs, for a0 ≥ 0n oe ﬀ o r tl e v e lˆ a ∈ (0,1) can be implemented. To see this, note that a
necessary condition for ˆ a to be implementable is that ˆ a is a local maximum of expected utility.
If, however, the bonus32 is chosen to equate marginal cost and marginal beneﬁt at eﬀort level
ˆ a, then it is easily veriﬁed that ˆ a locally minimizes expected utility. In contrast to the case of
quadratic eﬀort cost, with concave marginal eﬀort costs the principal may face implementation
problems also when a0 < 0. To see this, for a given a0 let aMaxdenote the eﬀort level at which the
MB(a) function is a tangent to the MC(a) function. Suppose that aMax < 1. For a  ∈ (0,a Max)
the bonus can be chosen appropriately such that a  satisﬁes ﬁrst- and second-order conditions
of local optimality. Hence, eﬀort level a  is implementable as long as E[U(a )] ≥ E[U(1)]. On
the other hand, no eﬀort level equal or greater to aMax is implementable by the same reasoning
as for a0 ≥ 0. For aMax ≥ 1 implementation problems obviously are not an issue.
Figure 3 illustrates the case of a convex marginal cost function. Reasoning along the lines of
the case with quadratic eﬀort costs makes clear that for a0 ≤ 0 each eﬀort level is implementable.
For a0 > 0, however, implementation problems still arise. For a given a0 let aMin denote the
eﬀort level at which the MB(a) function is a tangent to the MC(a) function. Suppose that
32Since the MB(a) curve is unaﬀected by the changes in the cost function, these and the following
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aMin < 1. Let b(aMin) denote the bonus that makes MB(a)at a n g e n tt oMC(a)a te ﬀ o r t
level aMin.B y c h o o s i n g b>b (aMin), the eﬀort level a  ∈ (aMin,1) at which MB(a)a n d
MC(a) intersect satisﬁes ﬁrst- and second-order conditions of local optimality. Hence, eﬀort
level a  is implementable as long as E[U(a )] ≥ E[U(0)]. Eﬀort level lower or equal to aMin,o n
the other hand, are not implementable: whenever the bonus is chosen such that ˆ a ∈ (0,a Min]
equates marginal cost and marginal beneﬁt, ˆ a locally minimizes expected utility. If aMin ≥ 1,
implementation problems are as severe as in the case with quadratic eﬀort costs.
The discussion so far has shown that implementation problems remain an issue when the
assumption of a quadratic cost function is relaxed. Moreover, whenever implementation problems
arise with convex or concave marginal cost functions, turning a blind eye still remedies these
problems. Consider the case of convex marginal costs and a0 strictly positive. Increasing the
probability of ignoring the bad signal decreases both a0 and aMin, thereby enlarging the set of
possibly implementable actions. Turning a blind eye suﬃciently often ﬁnally makes a0 negative
and implementation is not a problem any more. For concave marginal costs the same holds true:
ﬁrst of all, turning a blind eye allows to make a0 negative such at least some eﬀort level are
implementable. Moreover, increasing the probability of ignoring the bad signal further increases
aMax, thereby enlarging the set of potentially implementable actions. Last, since a0 can be made
arbitrarily negative, it is guaranteed that each eﬀort level can be implemented. Hence, turning
a blind eye still allows not only to mitigate but also to eradicate implementation problems.
5.2 General Gain-Loss Function
Next, we augment our basic model by analyzing a general gain-loss function. Moreover, we allow
for the agent being risk-averse due to diminishing marginal utility, that is, the agent’s intrinsic
utility is assumed to be a non-linear function. With respect to all other speciﬁcations we return
to the basic model with quadratic eﬀort cost. Let the agent’s intrinsic utility for money be
u(W), with u (W) > 0. Furthermore, we denote with uw := u(w) the agent’s intrinsic utility
from the base wage and with ub := u(w + b) agent’s intrinsic utility from obtaining the base
wage plus the bonus. Additionally, let uΔ ≡ ub − uw.
When the agent has accepted the contract, his expected utility ex-ante is given by
E[U(a)] = γ(a)[ub +( 1− γ(a))μ(ub − uw)] + (1 − γ(a))[uw + γ(a)μ(uw − ub)] − (k/2)a2 ,
where μ(·) is the gain-loss function and satisﬁes (A0)-(A4) of K˝ oszegi and Rabin (2006). To
simplify notation let φ(x) ≡− μ(−x) − μ(x). The value of the function φ(·)i st h ea b s o l u t e
disutility of feeling a loss and a gain of the same size. Note that φ(x)=φ(−x), φ(0) = 0 and
φ (|x|) > 0. With this notation the agent’s expected utility ex-ante can be rewritten as
E[U(a)] = uw + γ(a)uΔ − γ(a)(1 − γ(a))φ(uΔ) −
k
2
a2 .
The ﬁrst-order condition that determines the agent’s action choice is given by
dE[U(a)]
da
=( γH − γL)uΔ − (γH − γL)(1 − 2γ(a))φ(uΔ)
      
MB(a)
− ka     
MC(a)
! =0.
The marginal beneﬁt can be rewritten as
MB(a)=( γH − γL)[uΔ − φ(uΔ)(1 − 2γL)] + 2(γH − γL)2φ(uΔ)a.Term Paper Moral Hazard and Loss Aversion 22
Note that both MB(a)a n dMC(a) are increasing linear functions in a. Furthermore, the slope
of MB(a) is strictly increasing in |uΔ|. To obtain clear cut results we deﬁne the elasticity of the
compounded gain-loss function φ(·), Eφ(uΔ) ≡ (uΔφ (uΔ))/φ(uΔ) > 0 for all uΔ  =0 .
Assumption 2 Eφ(uΔ) ≤ 1 .
Assumption 2 rules out that the value of the compounded gain-loss changes a lot when the
extra intrinsic utility from obtaining the bonus changes a little.33 Futhermore, we make a more
technical assumption, that guarentees that MB(a) does not converge against some upper bound.
Assumption 3 limuΔ→∞φ(uΔ)=∞ and limuΔ→−∞ φ(uΔ)=∞ .
For the moment we assume that the bonus is positiv, thus uΔ > 0. To state our main ﬁnding
with regard to implementation and a positive bonus, let
¯ a0 =
1
γH − γL
 
1
2
 
1 − φ−1
+
 
k
2(γH − γL)2
 
2(γH − γL)2
k
 
− γL
 
,
where φ+(·):[ 0 ,∞) → [0,∞)w i t hφ+(x)=φ(x). Note that ¯ a0 depends on the performance
measure, ˆ γ, the agent’s loss aversion, φ(·), and the agent’s eﬀort cost function via k.
Lemma 1 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, ˆ a ∈ (0,1) is implementable with a non-negative bonus
if and only if ¯ a0 ≤ 0.
Proof: The candidate equilibrium eﬀort level ˆ a equates marginal beneﬁt and marginal cost,
MB(ˆ a)=MC(ˆ a). For a given uΔ ≥ 0, let a0(uΔ) denote the intersection of MB(a)w i t ht h e
horizontal axis. We have
a0(uΔ) ≡
1
γH − γL
 
1
2
 
1 −
uΔ
φ(uΔ)
 
− γL
 
.
Under Assumption 2, a0(uΔ) is decreasing in uΔ:
da0
duΔ
= −
1
2(γH − γL)
 
φ(uΔ) − uΔφ (uΔ)
(φ(uΔ))2
 
≤ 0 ⇐⇒ 1 −
uΔφ (uΔ)
φ(uΔ)
      
Eφ(uΔ)
≥ 0 .
Note that for uΔ =0t h eMB(A) curce coincides with the horizontal axis, and that the slope of
MB(a)i si n c r e a s i n gi nuΔ. Hence, under Assumption 3, MB(A) can be made arbitrarily steep.
Consequently, there exists a ¯ uΔ such that the slope of the MB(a) curve equals the slope of the
MC(a) curve. Formally,
2(γH − γL)2φ(¯ uΔ)=k ⇐⇒ ¯ uΔ = φ−1
+
 
k
2(γH − γL)2
 
.
Note that ¯ a0 = a0(¯ uΔ). As uΔ increases, the slope of MB(a) strictly increases and the intersec-
tion of MB(a) with the horizontal axis strictly decreases. Therefore, with both these reactions
of MB(a) being continuous, all actions ˆ a ∈ (0,1) can be implemented with a non-negative bonus
if ¯ a0 < 0. If ¯ a0 = 0, the only way to implement ˆ a ∈ (0,1) is to set the bonus such that uΔ =¯ uΔ.
Last, for ¯ a0 > 0, the agent always chooses a corner solution, that is, ˆ a ∈{ 0,1}.
The points A and B depicted in Figure 4 correspond to choice-acclimating personal equilibria,
whereas at point C depicted in Figure 5 agent’s expected utility ex-ante is minimized.
33As far as we know there is no evidence on whether actual behavior reﬂects this assumption on the
gain-loss function. We hope that future research will clarify this question.Term Paper Moral Hazard and Loss Aversion 23
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Figure 4: No implementation problems
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Figure 5: Implementation problems
Negative Extra Utility
In this subsection we consider the case of a negative bonus, and thus uΔ < 0. We show that a
negative bonus does not help to reduce the implementation problems.
Lemma 2 A necessary condition ˆ a ∈ (0,1) to be implementable with a negative bonus (uΔ < 0)
is γL > 1/2.
P r o o fo fL e m m aY :Deﬁne u−
Δ ≡− uΔ > 0. Then the agent’s expected utility ex-ante is
E[U(a)] = uw − γ(a)u−
Δ − γ(a)(1 − γ(a))φ(u−
Δ) −
k
2
a2 .
The equilibrum eﬀort choice will equate marginal cost and marginal beneﬁt. The marginal
beneﬁt in the case of a negative bonus is
MB−(a)=−(γH − γL)[u−
Δ + φ(u−
Δ)(1 − 2γL)] + 2(γH − γL)2φ(u−
Δ)a.
As before, the marginal beneﬁt is a linear increasing function in a. More important, when
uΔ decreases (e.g., the punishment gets harsher) then MB−(a) becomes steeper. For a given
uDelta let a−
0 (u−
Δ) denote the intersection of the MB−(a)-curve with the horizontal axis, that is,
MB−(a−
0 (u−
Δ)) = 0. Rearanging yields
a−
0 (u−
Δ) ≡
1
γH − γL
 
1
2
 
1+
u−
Δ
φ(u−
Δ)
 
− γL
 
.
Reasoning along the lines of the case uΔ > 0 makes clear that ˆ a ∈ (0,1) can be implemented
with a negative bonus if and only if a−
0 (u−
Δ) ≤ 0. Otherwise, e.g. for a−
0 (u−
Δ) > 0, the eﬀort level
that equates marginal cost and mariginal beneﬁt characterizes a minimum of agent’s ex-ante
expected utility. Obviously, a necessary condition for a−
0 (u−
Δ) < 0i sγL > 1/2.
From Lemma 1 it follows immediately that a suﬃcient condition for implementing ˆ a ∈ (0,1) with
a positiv bonus is γL > 1/2. In contrast, with a negative bonus γL > 1/2 is only a necessary
condition for ˆ a ∈ (0,1) to be implementable. Therefore, combining Lemmas 1 and 2 we obtain
the following result.
Proposition 6 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, ˆ a ∈ (0,1) is implementable if and only if ¯ a0 ≤ 0.Term Paper Moral Hazard and Loss Aversion 24
Implementation and Comparison of Performance Measures
The principal does not face implementation problems if ¯ a0 ≤ 0. From the deﬁnition of ¯ a0 it is
immediately obvious that whether or not this is the case is determined by the interplay of the
agents loss aversion, his eﬀort cost function, and the characteristics of the performance measure.
In particular, implementation problems do not arise irrespective of the agent’s loss aversion when
the performance measure is suﬃciently imprecise in the sense that the probability of observing
the good signal conditional on B not being realized is suﬃciently large.
Corollary 3 Suppose γL ≥ 1/2. Then under Assumptions 1 and 2 any action ˆ a ∈ (0,1) is
implementable.
Thus, there may be situations where the principal beneﬁts from a performance measure under
which it is more likely to receive the good signal. Remember that by turning a blind eye the
principal can increase both the probabilitiy of observing the good signal s = 1 conditional on B
being realized and the probability of observing the the good signal conditional on B not being
realized. Thus, increasing the probability of observing the good signal conditional on B not
being realized above the threshold 1/2 by turning a blind eye suﬃciently often solves all possible
implementation problems. This observation is as in the basic model.
Next, we deﬁne a criterion to compare performance measures. We call an performance measure
preferable from an implementation point of view if it reduces the implementation problems. A
performance measure reduces the implementation problems compared to an other performance
measure when the set of gain-loss functions for which nothing is implementable is reduced.
Deﬁnition 2 Consider two binary performance measures ˆ γ =( γH,γL) and ˆ ζ =( ζH,ζL).T h e
principal prefers performance measure ˆ γ from an implementation point of view to performance
measure ˆ ζ if and only if (i) for all fuctions φ(·) for which ˆ a ∈ (0,1) can be implemented with
performance measure ˆ ζ it can also be implemented with performance measure ˆ γ, (ii) there exists
at least one function φ(·) such that ˆ a ∈ (0,1) can be implemented with performance measure ˆ γ
but not with performance measure ˆ ζ.
With the above deﬁnition the next result is immediately obtained.
Proposition 7 Consider two binary performance measures ˆ γ =( γH,γL) and ˆ ζ =( ζH,ζL).
Suppose ζL < 1/2 and all possible φ(·) functions satisfy Assumptions 1 and 2. Then, performance
measure ˆ γ is preferable to performance measure ˆ ζ from an implementation point of view if and
only if γL >ζ L.
One last comment is in order. In this more general case the principal also beneﬁts from an
implementation point of view when the agent’s marginal cost of eﬀort increases. Formally,
d¯ a0/dk ≤ 0. This result is obtained by diﬀerentiating ¯ a0 with respect to k:
d¯ a0
dk
=
−1
2(γH − γL)k
 
1
φ (¯ uΔ)
− φ−1
 
k
2(γH − γL)2
 
2(γH − γL)2
k
 
=
−1
2(γH − γL)kφ (¯ uΔ)
[1 −E φ(¯ uΔ)] ≤ 0 ,
where
φ−1 
 
k
2(γH − γL)2
 
=
1
φ (¯ uΔ)
by the theorem on inverse functions, and the inequality holds by Assumption 2.Term Paper Moral Hazard and Loss Aversion 25
5.3 Preferred Personal Equilibrium
Last, we adopt a diﬀerent concept to solve the behavior of the loss averse agent: preferred per-
sonal equilibrium. As mentioned before, the appropriate equilibrium concept is highly related to
the underlying timing. Now we assume that the agent forms his expectations ﬁrst and thereafter
he chooses his action. An interpretation of this timing is that the agent forms expectation about
what he will do when he decides whether or not to accept the contract. Thereafter, in the case
of acceptance the agent chooses his eﬀort level. Typically there is a time lag between accepting
an employment contract and the ﬁrst working day. For these cases K˝ oszegi and Rabin (2006)
deﬁne the concept of personal equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 3 For a given bonus b, the eﬀort level ˆ a ∈ [0,1] is a personal equilibrium (PE) if
E [U(ˆ a|ˆ a)] ≥ E [U(a|ˆ a)] for all a ∈ [0,1].
When choosing his action, the agent takes his expectations as given. Given these expectations,
he chooses the action that maximizes his expected utility. An action corresponds to a PE when
the optimal action coincides with the expected one. The crucial feature of the PE is that the
agent cannot cheat himself, that is, he cannot choose expectations in equilibrium such that the
action choice yields to high expected gains. A drawback of the PE concept is that typically
a multiplicity problem arises. Put diﬀerently, for a given bonus b there exists a continuum of
actions that are personal equilibria. To deal with this multiplicity problem we assume that the
agent chooses the plan that maximizes his expected utility ex-ante out of the set of feasible
plans (e.g. the set of personal equilibria). Following K˝ oszegi and Rabin we denote this “best
plan choice” as preferred personal equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 4 For a given bonus b, the eﬀort level ˆ a ∈ Φ(b) is a preferred personal equilibrium
(PPE) if E [U(ˆ a|ˆ a)] ≥ E [U(a|a)] for all a ∈ Φ(b),w h e r eΦ(b) is the set of personal equilibria
for a given bonus b.
A crucial feature of PE and PPE in comparison to CPE is that choice must be optimal given
expectations at that time. Therefore, in PE/PPE the agent does not internalize the eﬀect of
his choice on expectations. In consequence the agent often does not maximize ex-ante expected
utility as he does in CPE. In PPE the agent can choose his favorite plan only from the plans that
are personal equilibria, whereas in CPE he can commit to his overall favorite plan. K˝ oszegi and
Rabin (forthcoming) show that a decision maker is more risk averse in CPE than in PE/PPE
in the sense that he may choose stochastically dominated options under CPE.
We restrict attention to a nonnegative bonus and return to the assumption of a piece-wise
linear gain-loss function. For a given bonus b ≥ 0, when the agent expected to choose action
ˆ a ∈ [0,1] but actually chooses action a ∈ [0,1], expected utility is given by
E [U(a|ˆ a)] = w + γ(a)b + γ(a)(1 − γ(ˆ a))b
− (1 − γ(a))γ(ˆ a)λb −
k
2
a2 + μ
 
k
2
a2 −
k
2
ˆ a2
 
.
As before, the agent receives his base wage for sure and gets the bonus with probability γ(a). He
gets the bonus with probability γ(a) while he expected not to get it with probability 1 − γ(ˆ a),
making the agent experience a gain of b. With probability 1 − γ(a) the agent does not get theTerm Paper Moral Hazard and Loss Aversion 26
bonus while he expected to receive the bonus with probability γ(ˆ a), which makes him feel a loss
of b. Moreover, in addition to the regular eﬀort cost, now there is also a gain-loss component
in the eﬀort dimension. In order to determine the agent’s preferred personal equilibrium, we
ﬁrst derive the set of personal equilibria. For ˆ a to be a PE, there must not be any proﬁtable
deviation in eﬀort, neither upward nor downward. For no proﬁtable upward deviation from ˆ a to
exist, we must have E [U(ˆ a|ˆ a)] ≥ E [U(a|ˆ a)] for all a>ˆ a.S o l v i n gf o rb yields that there is no
proﬁtable upward deviation as long as
b ≤
(λ +1 ) k(a +ˆ a)
2(γH − γL)[2+(λ − 1)γ(ˆ a)]
=: b(ˆ a,a)
for all a>ˆ a.W i t h db(ˆ a,a)/da > 0, there is no proﬁtable upward deviation from ˆ a if b ≤
lima ˆ a b(ˆ a,a)= :b(ˆ a), where
b(ˆ a)=
(λ +1 ) kˆ a
(γH − γL)[2+(λ − 1)γ(ˆ a)]
.
Analogously it can be shown that for no proﬁtable downward deviation from ˆ a to exist, bonus
b has to exceed
b(ˆ a)=
2kˆ a
(γH − γL)[2+(λ − 1)γ(ˆ a)]
,
at least weakly. It is readily veriﬁed that both lower bound b(ˆ a) and upper bound b(ˆ a)a r e
strictly increasing and strictly concave functions for ˆ a ≥ 0. Moreover, b(0) = b(0) = 0 and
b(ˆ a) < b(ˆ a) for all ˆ a>0. Deﬁne limˆ a→∞ b(ˆ a)=2 k/(γH − γL)2(λ − 1) =: b1 and limˆ a→∞b(ˆ a)=
(λ +1 ) k/(γH − γL)2(λ − 1) =: b2. Obviously, 0 <b 1 <b 2 < ∞. Hence, eﬀort level ˆ a is a
PE as long as b ∈ [b(ˆ a),b(ˆ a)]. Remember, however, that we are interested in the agent’s eﬀort
choice for a given bonus. Solving b(ˆ a)f o rˆ a as a function of b h e l p su st oc o n s t r u c tp a r to ft h e
upper boundary of a correspondence which gives us all eﬀort level that are a PE. We denote this
function by a(b). Accordingly, solving b(ˆ a)f o rˆ a determines part of the lower boundary of this
correspondence. This function is denoted by a(b). Formally,
a(b)=
b(γH − γL)
 
2+γL(λ − 1)
 
2k − b(γH − γL)2(λ − 1)
and a(b)=
b(γH − γL)
 
2+γL(λ − 1)
 
(λ +1 ) k − b(γH − γL)2(λ − 1)
.
Recalling that a ∈ [0,1], the set of PE for a given bonus b ≥ 0 is given by the correspondence
Φ(b)=
⎧
⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎩
{a|a ∈ [min{a(b),1},min{a(b),1}]} for b ≤ b1
{a|a ∈ [min{a(b),1},1]} for b ∈ (b1,b 2)
1f o r b ≥ b2
This correspondence is depicted graphically in Figure 6. Having determined the set of PE for a
given bonus b,Φ ( b), it remains to extract the agent’s PPE from this set of eﬀort level. Given b,
consider the agent’s expected utility from choosing eﬀort levels from the set of personal equilibria.
Since expectations are conﬁrmed in equilibrium, for each a ∈ Φ(b) expected utility is given by
E [U(a|a)]. The zero of the ﬁrst derivative with respect to a is given by
a∗(b)=
b(γH − γL)
 
2 − λ +2 γL(λ − 1)
 
k − 2b(γH − γL)2(λ − 1)
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Φ(b)
b b2 b1
a(b) a(b)
1
Figure 6: Correspondence of personal equilibria for a given bonus.
The second derivative of expected utility with respect to eﬀort takes the same form as under
CPE as solution concept,
d2E [U(a|a)]
da2 =2 b(γH − γL)2(λ − 1) − k.
This second derivative is negative if and only if b<˜ b,w h e r e
˜ b =
k
2(γH − γL)2(λ − 1)
.
From these considerations it follows that the curvature of E [U(a|a)], and hence whether a∗(b)i s
a minimum or maximum, is determined by whether b is greater, equal or lower than ˜ b.M o r e o v e r ,
whether a∗(b) is positive, equal to zero or negative is determined jointly by the sign of a0 and
whether b is greater, equal or lower than ˜ b. Last, note that da∗(b)/db < 0 if and only if a0 > 0.
Again, we consider the three cases determined by the model parameters, a0 < 0, a0 =0 ,a n d
a0 > 0.
Case 1: a0 < 0
With a0 < 0, da∗(b)/db > 0. The function a∗(b) is depicted in Figure 7. As long as b>˜ b,
expected utility is a strictly convex function of eﬀort, and its global minimum is attained at
a∗(b) < 0. Therefore, for b>˜ b the agent’s PPE is max{a|a ∈ Φ(b)}.F o r b = ˜ b,e x p e c t e d
utility is a positively sloped linear function, and again the agent chooses max{a|a ∈ Φ(b)}.F o r
b<˜ b, expected utility is a strictly concave function of eﬀort that attains its global maximum
at a∗(b) > 0. Due to concavity of expected utility, in PPE the agent chooses the eﬀort level
a ∈ Φ(b) which is as close as possible to a∗(b). With b  and b   be deﬁned as
b  :=
k(2 − 3γL)
(γH − γL)2(2 + λ)
and b   :=
k
 
λ(1 − 2γL) − γL 
(γH − γL)2(2 + λ)
,
the following lemma characterizes the agent’s eﬀort level in his preferred personal equilibrium
for a given bonus b, denoted by aPPE(b), depending on the model parameters γL, γH,a n dλ.
Lemma 3 Let a0 < 0.F o rb o n u sb ≥ 0, the agent’s preferred personal equilibrium, aPPE(b),i s
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1.) if γL > 2/3:
aPPE(b)=m a x{a|a ∈ Φ(b)} for b ≥ 0
2.) if γL ∈ [1/2,2/3] or γL ∈ [1/3,1/2] and λ ≤ γL/(1 − 2γL):
aPPE(b)=
 
min{a∗(b),1} for b ∈ [0,b  )
max{a|a ∈ Φ(b)} for b ≥ b 
3.) if γL ∈ [1/3,1/2] and λ>γ L/(1 − 2γL) or γL < 1/3:
aPPE(b)=
⎧
⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎩
min{a|a ∈ Φ(b)} for b ∈ [0,b   )
min{a∗(b),1} for b ∈ [b  ,b  )
max{a|a ∈ Φ(b)} for b ≥ b 
Proof: See Appendix.
For illustrative purposes, Figure 8 graphically depicts one possible conﬁguration of case (3) of
Lemma 3.
Φ(b)
b ˜ b
a∗(b)
1
Figure 7: Function a∗(b)f o ra0 < 0.
aPPE(b)
b
a∗(b)
b  b  
1
Figure 8: Preferred personal equilibria.
Case 2: a0 =0
With a0 = 0, ﬁrst and second derivative of expected utility with respect to eﬀort take the
following form:
dE[U(a|a)]
da
= −
 
k − 2b(λ − 1)(γH − γL)2 
a,
d2E[U(a|a)]
da2 =2 b(λ − 1)(γH − γL)2 − k.
For b<˜ b, expected utility is strictly concave function with its global maximum attained at
a∗(b) = 0. Therefore, for b<˜ b the agent’s PPE is given by min{a|a ∈ Φ(b)}.F o r b = ˜ b,Term Paper Moral Hazard and Loss Aversion 29
expected utility is a constant function for all a ≥ 0. Hence, the agent is indiﬀerent which eﬀort
level to choose. For b>˜ b, expected utility is a strictly convex function, with the global minimum
attained at a∗(b) = 0. Hence the agent’s PPE is max{a|a ∈ Φ(b)} for b>˜ b. We summarize
these ﬁndings in the following lemma.
Lemma 4 Let a0 =0 .F o rb o n u sb ≥ 0, the agent’s preferred personal equilibrium, aPPE(b),i s
given by
aPPE(b)=
⎧
⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎩
min{a|a ∈ Φ(b)} for b<˜ b
{a|a ∈ [0,1]} for b = ˜ b
max{a|a ∈ Φ(b)} for b>˜ b
Case 3: a0 > 0
First of all, remember that a0 > 0r e q u i r e sγL < 1/2a n dλ>2(1 − γL)/(1 − 2γL). With
a0 > 0, da∗(b)/db < 0. As long as b<˜ b, expected utility is a strictly concave function of
eﬀort, and its global maximum is attained at a∗(b) < 0. Therefore, for b<˜ b the agent’s PPE
is min{a|a ∈ Φ(b)}.F o rb = ˜ b, expected utility is a negatively sloped linear function, and again
the agent chooses min{a|a ∈ Φ(b)}. Last, consider b>˜ b. In this case, expected utility is a
strictly convex function of eﬀort which attains its minimum at a∗(b) > 0. If, for some b>˜ b,
a∗(b) > max{a|a ∈ Φ(b)}, due to convexity of expected utility the agent will choose eﬀort level
min{a|a ∈ Φ(b)}. Hence, if limb→∞a∗(b) ≥ 1 then the agent’s preferred personal equilibrium
is min{a|a ∈ Φ(b)} for all b>˜ b. In this case, each eﬀort level a ∈ (0,1) can be implemented
with a nonnegative bonus. If limb→∞ a∗(b) < 1, however, then implementation problems may
arise in the sense that not all eﬀort levels are implementable with a nonnegative bonus. Before
characterizing the cases in which this actually happens, we want to provide a rough formal
intuition where these implementation problems stem from. If limb→∞ a∗(b) < 1, then there
exists some bonus ˆ b with ˆ b>˜ b such that a∗(ˆ b) = 1. Suppose min{a|a ∈ Φ(ˆ b)} = a(ˆ b) < 1. As
argued above, for each b<ˆ b, the agent chooses min{a|a ∈ Φ(b)} = a(b). With da∗(b)/db < 0
and da(b)/db > 0, a∗(b)a n da(b) continuously move toward each other as b increases further, and
ﬁnally coincide at some eﬀort level ac < 1 . Denote the bonus for which this happens with bc,t h a t
is, a∗(bc)=a(bc)=ac. For any bonus b>b c, the agent always chooses max{a|a ∈ Φ(b)}. Hence,
at ﬁrst glance, one might conjecture that eﬀort levels in the interval (ac,max{a|a ∈ Φ(bc)})a r e
not implementable with a nonnegative bonus. This, however, has not to be true. It cannot be
excluded that the agent jumps back and forth between a(b)t om a x{a|a ∈ Φ(b)} for b ∈ (ˆ b,bc),
that is, before a∗(b)a n da(b) coincide. And if this should be the case, it may well be possible
that the agent jumps to some eﬀort level in the interval (ac,max{a|a ∈ Φ(bc)}). But also in this
case, while at least some eﬀort levels in (ac,max{a|a ∈ Φ(b)}) are implementable, some eﬀort
levels in (a(ˆ b),a c) are lost for implementation. The following lemma formally summarizes in
which cases implementation problems actually do arise.
Lemma 5 Let a0 > 0.34 For bonus b ≥ 0, the principal faces implementation problems in the
sense described above if
34Note that a0 > 0i se q u i v a l e n tt oγL < 1/2a n dλ>2(1−γL)/(1−2γL). For the sake of completeness,
however, we explicitly state these parameter restrictions in the cases listed in this lemma.Term Paper Moral Hazard and Loss Aversion 30
1.) γL < 1
2, γH ≥ 1
2, λ>
2(1−γL)
1−2γL ,o r
2.) γL < 1
2, γH ∈ (
2(1−γL)
5−6γL , 1
2), λ ∈
 
2(1−γL)
1−2γL ,
γH
1−2γH
 
such that
(λ +1 )
 
2 − λ +2 ( λ − 1)γH 
− (γH − γL)(λ − 1) > 0;
In all other cases, for b ≥ 0 the agent’s preferred personal equilibrium is given by
aPPE(b)=m i n{a|a ∈ Φ(b)}
and each eﬀort level a ∈ [0,1] is implementable with a nonnegative bonus.
Proof: See Appendix.
To sum up, under PPE as equilibrium concept implementation problems are not as severe as
under CPE. While with CPE the principal is not able to implement any eﬀort a ∈ (0,1) whenever
a0 > 0, this only is a suﬃcient condition for implementation problems to arise under PPE.
Moreover, even if a0 > 0, the principal will always be able to implement some strictly positive
eﬀort level though not all. Obviously, with a0 being the determinant whether the principal faces
implementation problems or not, turning a blind eye still allows to overcome these problems.
6C o n c l u s i o n
So, picking up the question from the beginning, what is the impact of loss aversion on the
provision of incentives? Who is right, Hollywood-based philosophy or economic intuition? In
order to answer this question we present a simple principal-agent model with moral hazard where
the agent has reference-dependent preferences. We ﬁnd that both is possible, loss aversion being
helpful for creating incentives on the one hand, and loss aversion being detrimental for the
agent’s motivation on the other hand. This result is due to the fact that a loss-averse agent
pursues two targets, maximizing intrinsic utility and reducing his expected loss. When these
targets are aligned then loss aversion provides an additional motivation of the agent that goes
beyond pure monetary incentives, thereby allowing the principal to implement high eﬀort with
lower-powered incentives. If, on the other hand, these two targets conﬂict with each other,
then loss aversion may be destructive for incentives and the agent is not willing to exert any
eﬀort at all. If loss aversion gives rise to this kind of implementation problems, however, the
principal is far from helpless. Turning a blind eye on the bad signal, that is, strategic ignorance
of information allows the principal to overcome these implementation problems and may also
reduce the cost of implementation.
This paper focused on a binary performance measure with only a good or a bad signal to
be observed. In reality, however, one might expect performance measures to be more variable.
Hence it would interesting to analyze how severe implementation problems are under a multi-
signal performance measure and whether turning a blind eye still remedies these problems. With
expectations being an important determinant of the agent’s behavior, a further venue for future
research might be to allow for the agent holding expectations when entering wage negotiations
about what contract the principal will oﬀer. This might be done, for example, in a market
environment where several principals compete for the services of multiple agents. Last, we
assume that the principal is not able to include lottery payments in the contract. While weTerm Paper Moral Hazard and Loss Aversion 31
already discussed that implementation problems can be solved if this is possible, the optimal
contract including stochastic payments remains an open question.
A Appendix
P r o o fo fR e m a r k1
We prove each of the comparative static results in turn.
(i) db(ˆ a)/dˆ a>0:
Diﬀerentiation of b(ˆ a) with respect to ˆ a yields
db(ˆ a)
dˆ a
=
k(2 − λ +2 γL(λ − 1))
(γH − γL)[1 − (1 − 2γ(ˆ a)(λ − 1)]2.
Since a0 < 0 the result immediately follows.
(ii) db(ˆ a)/dλ  0:
Diﬀerentiation of b(ˆ a) with respect to λ yields
db(ˆ a)
dλ
=
kˆ a(1 − 2γ(ˆ a))
(γH − γL)[1 − (1 − 2γ(ˆ a)(λ − 1)]2.
We have db(ˆ a)/dλ > 0 if and only if 1 − 2γ(ˆ a) < 0.
(iii) db(ˆ a)/dγH < 0:
Diﬀerentiation of b(ˆ a) with respect to γH yields
db(ˆ a)
dγH = −kˆ a
 
2 − λ +2 γ(ˆ a)(λ − 1) + 2(γH − γL)(λ − 1)ˆ a
 
[(γH − γL)[1 − (1 − 2γ(ˆ a)(λ − 1)]]
2 .
Since a0 < 0 the result immediately follows.
(vi) db(ˆ a)/dγL  0:
Diﬀerentiation of b(ˆ a) with respect to γL yields
db(ˆ a)
dγL = −kˆ a
 
−[2 − λ +2 γ(ˆ a))(λ − 1)] + 2(γH − γL)(λ − 1)(1 − ˆ a)
 
[(γH − γL)[1 − (1 − 2γ(ˆ a)(λ − 1)]]
2 .
Since a0 < 0 the ﬁrst term of the numerator is positive. With the second term of the
numerator being negative, the sign of the expression as a whole is undetermined.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
We prove each of the comparative static results in turn.
(i) dC(ˆ a)/dˆ a>0:
With the minimum cost of implementing action ˆ a being given by C(ˆ a)=¯ u +( k/2)ˆ a2 +
γ(ˆ a)(1 − γ(ˆ a))(λ − 1)b(ˆ a), we have
dC(ˆ a)
dˆ a
=
∂C(ˆ a)
∂ˆ a
+
∂C(ˆ a)
∂b
db(ˆ a)
dˆ a
.
From Remark 1 we know that db(ˆ a)/dˆ a>0. Furthermore, ∂C(ˆ a)/∂b = γ(ˆ a)(1−γ(ˆ a))(λ−
1) > 0. It remains to determine the sign of ∂C(ˆ a)/∂ˆ a.F i r s t ,n o t et h a t∂C(ˆ a)/∂ˆ a = kˆ a +Term Paper Moral Hazard and Loss Aversion 32
b(ˆ a)(λ−1)(γH −γL)(1−2γ(ˆ a)). From the ﬁrst-order condition that determines the agent’s
action choice for a given bonus we know that kˆ a =( γH −γL)b(ˆ a)[1− (λ − 1)(1 − 2γ(ˆ a))].
Substituting this immediately yields ∂C(ˆ a)/∂ˆ a =( γH − γL)b(ˆ a) > 0, which establishes
the desired result.
(ii) dC(ˆ a)/dλ < 0:
Diﬀerentiation of C(ˆ a)w i t hr e s p e c tt oλ yields
dC(ˆ a)
dλ
=
kˆ aγ(ˆ a)(1 − γ(ˆ a))
(γH − γL)[1− (1 − 2γ(ˆ a))(λ − 1)]
2.
The result follows immediately.
(iii) dC(ˆ a)/dγH < 0:
Diﬀerentiation of C(ˆ a)w i t hr e s p e c tt oγH and rearranging the numerator yields
dC(ˆ a)
dγH =
(λ − 1)kˆ a
[(γH − γL)[1− (1 − 2γ(ˆ a))(λ − 1)]]
2×
[ˆ a(1 − 2γ(ˆ a))(γH − γL) − ˆ a(γH − γL)(λ − 1) − γ(ˆ a)(1 − γ(ˆ a))(2 − λ +2 γL(λ − 1))
      
>0
].
The sign of dC(ˆ a)/dγH < 0 is completely determined by the sign of the expression in
square brackets. The last term of the expression in square brackets is positive since
a0 < 0. Hence, for 1 − 2γ(ˆ a) ≤ 0, the whole expression in square brackets is negative and
we have dC(ˆ a)/dγH < 0. It remains to consider 1−2γ(ˆ a) > 0. Rearranging the expression
in square brackets yields
dC(ˆ a)
dγH < 0 ⇐⇒ λ
 
γL(1 − 2γ(ˆ a)) − γ(ˆ a)2(1 − 2γL)
 
< 2γL(1 − 2γ(ˆ a))2 (A.1)
Since the right hand side of the last inequality is positive, if the term in square brackets
on the left-hand side is negative, the dC(ˆ a)/dγH < 0 for all λ>1. It remains to check
whether the inequality holds for the term in square brackets on the left-hand side being
positive. This is least likely for large values of λ.N o t e t h a t 1 − 2γ(ˆ a) > 0 implies
γL < 1/2. Hence, since a0 < 0, we must have have 2−λ+2γL(λ−1) > 0, or equivalently
λ<2(1 − γL)/(1 − 2γL). This implies that λ<2(1 − γ(ˆ a))/(1 − 2γ(ˆ a)). Hence, if we
replace λ by 2(1 − γL)/(1 − 2γL) and (A1) still holds, then it holds for all values of λ
under consideration. And indeed, it can be shown that
2(1 − γL)
1 − 2γL
 
γL(1 − 2γ(ˆ a)) − γ(ˆ a)2(1 − 2γL)
 
< 2γL(1 − 2γ(ˆ a))2 ⇐⇒ γ(ˆ a)(γ(ˆ a) − γL) > 0,
where the last inequality obviously holds true for all ˆ a ∈ (0,1). Hence, dC(ˆ a)/dγH < 0
for 1 − 2γ(ˆ a) > 0. This establishes the desired result.
(vi) dC(ˆ a)/dγL  0:
Diﬀerentiation of C(ˆ a)w i t hr e s p e c tt oγL and rearranging the numerator yields that the
sign of dC(ˆ a)/dγL is equal to the sign of
[2 − λ +2 γ(ˆ a)(λ − 1)][(1 − ˆ a)(1 − 2γ(ˆ a))(γH − γL)+γ(ˆ a)(1 − γ(ˆ a))]
− γ(ˆ a)(1 − γ(ˆ a))(γH − γL)2(λ − 1)(1 − ˆ a).Term Paper Moral Hazard and Loss Aversion 33
The following examples illustrate that the sign of dC(ˆ a)/dγL is undetermined and de-
pends on model parameters and the action to be implemented. While for (λ,γL,γH,ˆ a)=
(5,.5,1,.1) we have dC(ˆ a)/dγL < 0, for (λ,γL,γH,ˆ a)=( 1 .5,.05,0.95,.1), on the other
hand, we have dC(ˆ a)/dγL > 0.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4
If ˆ a ∈ (0,1) is implementable with a strictly negative bonus, that is, a−
0 ≤ 0, then by Corollary
1w eh a v ea0 < 0. It is easy to verify that the required punishment to implement ˆ a is larger
in absolute value than than the respective nonnegative bonus which is needed to implement ˆ a,
that is, b∗(ˆ a) < |b−(ˆ a)| and b∗(ˆ a) < |b−
0 | for all ˆ a ∈ (0,1). Suppose a−
0 < 0. When punishing the
agent with b−(ˆ a), the base wage, w−(ˆ a), will be chosen to satisfy the corresponding participation
constraint with equality, that is,
w−(ˆ a)=¯ u +
k
2
ˆ a2 − γ(ˆ a)b−(ˆ a)[λ − γ(ˆ a)(λ − 1)].
Remembering that, if ˆ a is implemented with a nonnegative bonus, the base wage is set eqal to
w∗(ˆ a)=¯ u +
k
2
ˆ a2 − γ(ˆ a)b∗(ˆ a)[2− λ + γ(ˆ a)(λ − 1)],
allows to show that the minimum cost of implementing ˆ a with a nonnegative bonus is lower than
the minimum implementation cost with a strictly negative bonus:
C(w−(ˆ a),b −(ˆ a)) = w−(ˆ a)+γ(ˆ a)b−(ˆ a)
=¯ u +
k
2
ˆ a2 − γ(ˆ a)b−(ˆ a)[λ − γ(ˆ a)(λ − 1) − 1]
> ¯ u +
k
2
ˆ a2 + γ(ˆ a)b∗(ˆ a)[λ − γ(ˆ a)(λ − 1) − 1]
=¯ u +
k
2
ˆ a2 − γ(ˆ a)b∗(ˆ a)[1− λ + γ(ˆ a)(λ − 1)]
=¯ u +
k
2
ˆ a2 − γ(ˆ a)b∗(ˆ a)[2− λ + γ(ˆ a)(λ − 1)] + γ(ˆ a)b(ˆ a)
= w∗(ˆ a)+γ(ˆ a)b∗(ˆ a)
= C(w∗(ˆ a),b ∗(ˆ a))
Obviously, the same line of argument holds when a−
0 = 0, which concludes the proof.
P r o o fo fL e m m a3
With a0 < 0, da∗(b)/db > 0. As long as b>˜ b, expected utility is a strictly convex function of
eﬀort, and its global minimum is attained at a∗(b) < 0. Therefore, for b>˜ b the agent’s PPE
is max{a|a ∈ Φ(b)}.F o rb = ˜ b, expected utility is a positively sloped linear function, and again
the agent chooses max{a|a ∈ Φ(b)}. Things become less straight forward for b<˜ b.N o t et h a t
˜ b<b 1.F o rb<˜ b, expected utility is a strictly concave function of eﬀort that attains its global
maximum at a∗(b) > 0. In order to determine the agent’s PPE in this case, ﬁrst compare a∗(b)
to a(b):
a∗(b) < a(b) ⇐⇒ k(2 − 3γL) >b (γH − γL)2(2 + λ)
For γL ≥ 2/3 the above inequality never holds and a∗(b) > a(b) for all b<˜ b. Hence, the
agent will always choose aPPE(b)=m a x {a|a ∈ Φ(b)}. This is case (1) of Lemma 3. ConsiderTerm Paper Moral Hazard and Loss Aversion 34
γL < 2/3. Obviously a∗(0) < a(0). Moreover, a0 < 0 implies that a∗(˜ b) > a(˜ b). Hence, by the
Intermediate-Value-Theorem there exists b  ∈ (0,˜ b) such that a∗(b) > a(b) if and only if b>b  ,
where
b  =
k(2 − 3γL)
(γH − γL)2(2 + λ)
.
It is easy to show that a0 < 0 implies that b  < ˜ b. It remains to compare a∗(b)t oa(b). First,
note that a∗(0) = a(0). Next,
a∗(b) >a (b) ⇐⇒ k
 
λ(1 − 2γL) − γL 
<b (γH − γL)2(2 + λ)
For γL ≥ 1/2 we always have a∗(b) >a (b) for all b>0. Hence, the agent will choose aPPE =
min{a∗(b),1} for b<b   and aPPE =m a x {a|a ∈ Φ(b)} for b ≥ b . This is the ﬁrst part of case (2)
of Lemma 3. Consider γL < 1/2. A suﬃcient condition for the above inequality to hold is that
the left-hand side is nonpositive, or equivalently, λ ≤ γL/(1 − 2γL). With λ>1, a necessary
condition for this to hold is γL ≥ 1/3. These observations leave us with three cases to consider:
(i) γL ∈ (1/3,1/2) and λ ≤ γL/(1 − 2γL), (ii) γL ∈ (1/3,1/2) and λ>γ L/(1 − 2γL), and (iii)
γL < 1/3. In case (i), we again have a∗(b) >a (b) for all b>0. Hence, aPPE =m i n {a∗(b),1}
for b<b   and aPPE =m a x {a|a ∈ Φ(b)} for b ≥ b , which completes case (2) of Lemma 3. In
cases (ii) and (iii) where the left-hand side of the above inequality is positive, on the other hand,
a∗(b) >a (b) if and only if b>b   ,w h e r e
b   =
k
 
λ(1 − 2γL) − γL 
(γH − γL)2(2 + λ)
.
Last, note that a0 < 0 implies that b   <b  . The agent chooses aPPE =m i n {a|a ∈ Φ(b)} for
b<b   , aPPE =m i n {a∗(b),1} for b ∈ [b  ,b  ), and aPPE =m a x {a|a ∈ Φ(b)} for b ≥ b  .T h i si s
case (3) of Lemma 3, which concludes the proof.
P r o o fo fL e m m a5
In order to characterize the cases in which implementation problems actually do arise, ﬁrst note
that
lim
b→∞
a∗(b)=
λ − 2 − 2γL(λ − 1)
2(γH − γL)(λ − 1)
.
For implementation problems to arise we must have limb→∞a∗(b) < 1. It is readily veriﬁed that
lim
b→∞
a∗(b) ≥ 1 ⇐⇒ γH <
1
2
and λ ≥
2(1 − γH)
1 − 2γH .
Hence, there are two possible cases in which implementation problems may be an issue: (i)
γH ≥ 1/2 or (ii) γH < 1/2a n dλ<2(1 − γH)/(1 − 2γH). Deﬁne bonus ˆ b such that a∗(ˆ b)=1 .
Formally,
ˆ b =
k
(γH − γL)[2− λ +2 γH(λ − 1)]
.
For a∗(ˆ b) < 1a n da0 > 0w eh a v eˆ b>˜ b. For implementation problems to arise, besides
limb→∞ a∗(b) < 1w em u s ta l s oh a v em i n {a|a ∈ Φ(ˆ b)} = a(ˆ b) < 1. A necessary condition for this
to hold true is
ˆ b<b 2 ⇐⇒ 2+( λ − 1)
 
λ(2γH − 1) + γH + γL 
> 0.Term Paper Moral Hazard and Loss Aversion 35
Note that this is always satisﬁed for γH ≥ 1/2. The above necessary condition implies
a(ˆ b) < 1 ⇐⇒ λ(1 − 2γH) <γ H.
For γH ≥ 1/2 this always holds. Hence, a ﬁrst case in which implementation problems arise is
given by γL < 1/2, γH ≥ 1/2a n dλ>2(1 − γL)/(1 − 2γL). This is the ﬁrst part of Lemma 5.
For γH < 1/2, on the other hand, a(ˆ b) < 1r e q u i r e sλ<γ H/(1 − 2γH). For γH < 1/2w eh a v e
γH/(1−2γH) < 2(1−γH)/(1−2γH) and, moreover, 2(1−γL)/(1−2γL) <γ H/(1−2γH)i fa n d
only if γH > 2(1−γL)/(5−6γL). Hence, the second case in which implementation problems arise
given by (ii) γL < 1/2, γH ∈ (2(1−γL)/(5−6γL),1/2), λ ∈ (2(1−γL)/(1−2γL),γH/(1−2γH)),
and (λ +1 )
 
2 − λ +2 γH(λ − 1)
 
− (γH − γL)(λ − 1) > 0. This is the second part of Lemma 5,
which concludes the proof.
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